Migration Watch UK

“Balanced Migration... is based on a simple principle: that the number of immigrants who are given permission to settle permanently in this country should be kept to approximately the same level as the number of British citizens who are emigrating. We are not seeking to reduce the number of people who come to work here for a few years and return home.”20
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39

20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.

Migration Watch

points to the different policies of the political parties on immigration.60
main issue is whether contributing to society as a worker for 3-4 years should automatically have a path leading to settlement.61
economic migration (note admittance that most do not migrate for work purposes) may benefit employers, but costly for taxpayers and sectors of the indigenous population.62
contra claims of contribution in taxes claims (1) year used 1999/2000 atypical in terms of overall government surplus (2) ignores costs of immigrants (3) unfair in that it compares young immigrants to an, in average, older indigenous population.63
remittances have a negative effect on foreign exchange.64
claims of immigrant contribution have underestimated their impact on population growth, especially children born in the UK.65 in another paper this is amended, Government treats UK born children of mixed marriages as UK children, MWUK would rather they were treated as half/half.66 Still maintain there is no net benefit when compared to existing population.67
Quotes M Wolffe “The desirability of sizeable immigration is a matter more of values than of economics. It is not a choice between wealth and poverty, but of the sort of country one desires to inhabit.”68
note fear of a “Back door” route into the UK, especially through (1) amnesty to illegals in other countries (2) fast access to citizenship/settlement, would prefer 10 years of residence.69
points to London receiving 65% of immigrants.70
complains about the excessive extensions granted to student visas, which it sees as another “back door” into the UK.71
Statistics on Brazilian students (new visas/extensions) 2001: 10700/3395 ....2002: 9700/4635....2003: 8840/753072
claims that with zero net migration only 30% of the current projected homes built on greenfield sites would need to be built.73
Disputes claims by IPPR that granting an amnesty to illegal immigrants would bring in £1 billion a year to the treasury claiming that the cost would actually be of £0.8-1.8 billion a year. Main arguments: 1) IPPR calculations do not include the various public funds that immigrants would have access to 2) IPPR calculations underestimated the number of immigrants but overestimated the number in employment and how much they are earning.74 [note however that MWUK do not factor in the cost of deporting the illegal immigrants]
Outlines the UK Borders Act of 2007, significant for 1) the power of deportation at ports 2) biometric ID for immigrants 3) automatic deportation of foreign criminals.75
suggests that confusion may arise because of changes in terminology.76 Because Home Office is not always able to send Presenting Officers to Immigration Appeals, proposes that judges be allowed a more inquisitorial role.77
“The internationally accepted United Nations definition of a migrant is someone who changes his or
her country of usual residence for a period of at least a year”78

60Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 51–54.
61Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
62Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
63Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
64Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
65Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
66Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
67Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
68Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 9.
69A Green, “Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs) – INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC MIGRATION TO THE EU” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_8_inquiry_into_economic_migration_to_the_eu.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
70Migrationwatch UK, “Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs on ‘The Economic Impact of Immigration’” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_18_Submission_to_Hof.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
71Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 1.
72Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 2.
73Migrationwatch UK, “The impact of immigration on housing in England” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Housing/7_9_Impact_of_Immigration_on_housing.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
74Migrationwatch UK, “THE TRUE COST OF AN AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_19_True_cost_of_Amnesty.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008].
75H Mitchell, “UK Borders Act 2007” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_21_UK_Borders_Act_07.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008]
76H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
77H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
78Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.

White

“The influxes of labour which started during the years of economic reconstruction, and which later developed into family movement, have created whole communities of ethnic minorities in most large European cities.”1
difficulties of enumeration include clandestine migration, the issue of definition, especially when migrants are citizens of the country they are going to.2
migration of indigineous population to the suburbs increases impact of migration on cities.3
housing circumstances reflects the status and culture of the migrants, and the attitude of those who are powerful in the housing sector.4
London issue of exploitation of immigrant residents in slum property by landlords, often of similar ethnic origin in the 1960s.5
points to the fact that segregation may be a defensive approach of the migrants themselves, or part of a housing strategy.6
refers to a tendency towards dispersal rather than segregation; but uncertain whether it will remain.7
1P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 65.
2P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
3P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
4P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 68.
5P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 70.
6P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 71–72.
7P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 73.

Nathan

Critiques the way that migration is often presented in terms of national benefits v local costs; argues that there is a lack of research on the long term impact of migration on local communities.1
uneven spread of migrants across Britain, concentration in large cities but increasing presence in rural areas.2
Key agencies (1) Home office (2) MAC- Migration Advisory Committee has the role of determining employer needs (3) MIF- Migration Impact Forum3
compared to other countries long term migration intake in the UK is low, yet short term migration flow is high, and becoming more significant than long term.4
migration leading to changes in both large and smaller urban areas with an increase in diversity.5
Three major effects of migration on local economies: 1) skills 2) diversity 3) size of population and of economy.6
employers like migrants: 1) “hard and soft skills” 2) “bring fresh ideas, approaches and experiences.”7
tendency for the “downgrading” of highly skilled migrants.8
In the long term migration expected to have little if no effect on wage and employment levels. In the short term impact may be reduced by migrants competing between themselves for jobs UK population do not want. Marginalisation of migrants may cause problems as this may encourage a “cheap labour” fix rather than an improvement in technology and in the skills of the existing workforce.9
Diversity 1) widens skill set 2) innovation 3) emergence of new markets, both in the country and overseas.10
migrants have a “housing footprint” that is below average due to the tendency to share accomodation.11
1M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
2M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
3M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
4M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
5M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
6M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 15.
7M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
8M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
9M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
10M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 20–22.
11M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.

Fielding

Points to neo-liberal (ie free market) arguments against migration policies and libertarian arguments which see it as a breach of human rights.1
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.

Mason

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One aspect of immigration from the New Commonwealth was to aid the reconstruction process. Another was that in this period there “was a growing demand for skilled workers in emergent sectors” so that as British workers gained upward mobility gaps in “unskilled and routine semi-skilled jobs at the lower levels of the labour market” appeared especially in “declining industries where cheap labour was a substitute for capital investment or an alternative to collapse.”¹

1905 Aliens Act (essentially a response to Jewish migration) sought to manage the entry of foreigners although not vigorously applied “Its main significance lay in the fact that it represented a breach of the longstanding principle...that entry to Britain should be open”. Further legislation emerged with the imminence of the First World War which “gave the Home Secretary powers to exclude or deport those thought undesirable and introduced a requirement of registration with the police.”²

New Commonwealth immigrants occupied the least desirable jobs and housing.³ Social strains emerged.⁴

Voucher system established in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.⁵

Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, in introducing the principle of patriality to thrawrt the arrival of East African Asians had the unworded intention of discriminating according to colour.⁶

Work permit system established in the 1971 Immigration Act established “a practical limitation on their ability to challenge poor working conditions or to involve themselves in any kind of political or trade union activity.”⁷

1991 ethnic minorities at 3 million, 5.5% of the population.⁸ 4 million born outside of the UK.⁹

tendency for spatial concentration of ethnic minorities.¹⁰ See table by district.¹¹

“immigration controls introduced from 1962 onwards was increasingly to exclude potential migrants who were not white...colour other than white might arouse suspicions about citizenship status.”¹²

“attempts to prevent illegal entry have frequently extended beyond ports of entry, into the wider community....the subtle message received by many of Britain's minority ethnic citizens is that they are second class citizens.”¹³

1D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 23.

2D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 24.

3D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.

4D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.

5D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.

6D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 27.

7D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 28.

8D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 32–33.

9D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 37.

10D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 35.

11D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 36.

12D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 123.

13D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 124.

Beckford

J Beckford, Three Paradoxes in the Relations between Religion and Politics in an English City , Review of Religious Research 39:4 (1998) 344–359.

Points to three million people associated to non-Christian religious communities living in the UK, concentrated in inner city areas.¹

“The Church's repeated state- ments of official support for multi-culturalism, coupled with its creation of a net- work of diocesan advisers on inter-faith relations, are evidence of the seriousness with which it regards this part of its mission. This does not mean, however, that all Anglican clergy or laity are enthusiastic about multi-culturalism. Nor should it be allowed to conceal the fact that Anglicans have usually been powerful enough in local communities to act as brokers on their own terms for 'other faiths.'”²

“the one-way deterministic approach which defines immigrants as "vic- tims" is unable to account for the dialectic process which interaction between the immigrant group and the state generates. This process results in the increasing integration into wider structures while, simultaneously, it fosters a separate cultural institutional identity (Werbner, 1991b:141 quoted in Lewis, 1994:72).”³

1J Beckford, Three Paradoxes in the Relations between Religion and Politics in an English City , Review of Religious Research 39:4 (1998) 344–359, 344–345.

2J Beckford, Three Paradoxes in the Relations between Religion and Politics in an English City , Review of Religious Research 39:4 (1998) 344–359, 351.

3J Beckford, Three Paradoxes in the Relations between Religion and Politics in an English City , Review of Religious Research 39:4 (1998) 344–359,

Johnston

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"Whereas in the United States the predominant model was one of assimilation and integration, whereby immigrants and, especially, their descendants changed their identity, ‘became Americans’

and became spatially assimilated into their ‘host society’, in other countries multi-cultural models developed whereby immigrants became economically and politically assimilated into ‘mainstream’ society but retained their cultural identity. The latter may include a wish to live in particular neighbourhoods where sustaining their cultural distinctiveness may be easier. This has been the case recently in Britain, where multi-cultural policies have been pursued by successive governments."(12)

research suggesting low spatial segregation¹ (12)

fear over the emergence of racial ghettoes and self-segregation² (12-14)

"We can use this simple ‘balance of forces’ argument to present a simple model of segregation trends over time – where segregation is defined as the degree to which members of a group live apart from members of other groups and in areas where members of their own group dominate. In the early years after a group moves to a city, the level of ethnic concentration will increase. If, however, either in-migration Jdeclines or the degree of spatial assimilation becomes greater than that of in-migration (whereby members of the group, especially their descendants, leave the areas of concentration to live elsewhere in the city), then the level of concentration will fall: the proportion of members identifying with the ethnic group living in relatively segregated areas will decline. Only if assimilation is slow relative to the group’s growth (through either or both of natural increase and continued in-migration) will levels of concentration continue to increase." ³(16-17)

"on-White ethnic group: and only 2 per cent of those with dual ethnicities lived in the Type V areas. These patterns clearly confirm our expectations with regard to residential choices of those choosing single and dual ethnicities. The latter group are much more likely to live in areas where Whites either dominate or predominate than are their counterparts who claim a single non-white ethnicity. With assimilation – as indicated by the claim of a dual ethnicity – comes desegregation."⁴ (23)

recognises that this trend is not so significant in London but suggests that this might come down to (1) the greater preponderance on non-Whites in London (2) the desire to not move to far away from family⁵ (26-27) claims that the assimilation model is still working in England and Wales⁶ (28)

1R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 12.

2R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 12–14.

3R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 16–17.

4R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 23.

5R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 26–27.

6R. Johnston, M. Poulsen & J. Forrest, ' Ethnic Residential Segregation and Assimilation in British Towns and Cities: a Comparison of those claiming Single and Dual Ethnic Identities', Migration Letters Volume 3 Issue 1 (April 2006), 11–30, 28.

Conn and Ortiz

o "In the English speaking world the inner-city core is increasingly reserved for the poor and the non Anglo-Saxon immigrants. In non-English speaking Europe, by comparison, people of different income groups live intermingled in the city while preserving class distinctions within and among buildings."¹ (69)

"the city becomes the land of those who are left behind- the poor, the underemployed, the ethnic outsider. The conditions they inherit are economic decline, physical decay and social disintegration.²" (70)

fortress Europe and foreigners being considered second class citizens³ (71)

"the deep-rootedness of England's class system is in conflict with this multiethnic presence."⁴ (72)

"the Western European welcome to the guest worker is vanishing in the face of automation and the transfer of specialized industries to other parts of the world"⁵ (208-209)

links to racism against immigrants ⁶(209)

international travel has increased migration, greater feminization of migrants ⁷(212)

o impact of migration: (i) unsettled (ii) loss of family support system (iii) open to novelty⁸ (319-320)

ethnic identity linked to encountering otherness⁹ (321)

immigration process

(i) voluntary segregation followed either by assimilation or pluralism ¹⁰(321-323)

o

claims that applying the HUP in multi-ethnic cities actually ends up killing churches as "these churches literally die off because they are incapable of reaching out to the new citizens of the community, people who are from a different ethnic group and maybe even a different socioeconomic class."¹¹ (331)

Ortiz models of integrating ethnic churches:

(1) renting model

(2) celebrative model--still separate but diversity celebrated

(3) integrative model--co-equal leadership, shared ownership of facilities, vision and ministry approach. ¹²(331-332)

o

Second generation ethnic churches: immigrant churches: torn between two languages. Principles

(1) maintain their identity

(2) know their own history

(3) church leaders need to understand them

(4) need for leadership

(5) language--sermons in English but other language used for other items¹³ (333)

o

spiritual warfare in cities---religious pluralism, polarization of ethnic groups ¹⁴(358-359)

1H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 69.

2H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 70.

3H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 71.

4H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 72.

5H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 208–209.

6H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001)209.

7H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 212.

8H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 319–320.

9H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 321.

10H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 321–323.

11H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 331.

12H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 331–332.

13H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001)333.

14H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 358–359.

Castles and Miller

"when people come from poor to rich countries, without local knowledge or networks, lacking proficiency in the language and unfamiliar with local ways of working, then their entry point into the labour market is likely to be at a low level. The question is whether there is a fair change of later upward mobility."¹ (201)

"Causes of residential segregation include low income and lack of local networks, informal and institutional discrimination and the desire of immigrants to group together for cultural maintenance and for protection against racism."²

(204)

where racism is weak, tendency for migrants to move on, where racism is stronger tendency for concentration to continue. ³(205)

"Racism is often a self-fulfilling prophecy: it justifies itself by portraying immigrants as alien groups, which will 'take over' the neighbourhood. By forcing immigrants to live together for protection, racism creates the 'ghettoes' it fears."⁴ (206)

"Areas of concentration of specific immigrant groups are often the focus of conflicts with other disadvantaged sections of the population."⁵ (206)

"Much of the energy and innovative capacity within the cities lies in the cultural syncretism of the multi-ethnic population."⁶ (208)

o

in analysing why some groups become ethnic communities and others ethnic minorities "two groups of factors appear relevant: those connected with characteristics of the settlers themselves, and those connected with the social structures, cultural practices and ideologies of receiving societies."⁷ (213)

settlers-- (i) phenotypical difference is seen as the key issue.

o

"some countries of immigration make it very difficult for immigrants to become citizens, others grant citizenship but only at the price of cultural assimilation, while a third group makes it possible for immigrants to become citizens while maintaining distinct cultural identities."⁸ (219)

"Dual citizenship is generally rejected by governments because of fears of 'divided loyalties', yet it is becoming increasingly common, especially for the children of mixed marriages."⁹ (221)

monolingualism is the principle in Britain yet there has been the need to introduce language services for practical reasons.

o

some immigrants can become citizens without discernible political effects, others may become disenfranchised and marginalised members of society¹⁰ (231)

1S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 201.

2S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 204.

3S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 205.

4S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 206.

5S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 206.

6S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 208.

7S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 213.

8S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 219.

9S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 221.

10S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 231.