Claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
negative focus on Asian enclaves, especially those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.20
defends Ron Atkinsons use of “nigger” to refer to Desailly, and other expressions such as “Paki” and “Wog.” In part based upon the use of derogatory terms for whites by other ethnic groups.21
complains about anti-white racism, especially “mugging” which he presents as a black hate crime against whites.22
denies that there was any significant immigrant component to the British population prior to the post WWII period.23
denies any significant link between immigration and colonialism24 (argues that British wealth came from Industrial revolution not empire; but does not deal with impact of Empire on former colonies)
points to the lack of investigation in the case of student visas, suggests this is a form of coming in as an economic migrant.25
criticism of the impact of immigrants, on the NHS, especially those who come specifically for treatment.26
“poor whites at all levels strongly dislike immigration...there is another section of the population that consistently feels most antagonized of all... 'Middle Englanders' who are neither poor nor well-off”27
hostility of ME-s to immigrants who have no cultural background in the country yet benefit from the welfare system.28
“Mori found that satisfaction with local government had a very strong inverse relation to the proportion of ethnic minorities in an area.”29
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
20S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 97–113.
21S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 114–128.
22S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 128–132.
23S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135.
24S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135–137.
25S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 140–145.
26S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 175–187.
27S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 199.
28S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 200–201.
29S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 202.
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Impact. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Impact. Show all posts
Tuesday, 25 November 2008
migration watch
“he years 1991 – 2006 there was a net movement of some 2.3 million people to the UK - only 8% of which came from the new East European members of the EU”1
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
Migration Watch UK
“Balanced Migration... is based on a simple principle: that the number of immigrants who are given permission to settle permanently in this country should be kept to approximately the same level as the number of British citizens who are emigrating. We are not seeking to reduce the number of people who come to work here for a few years and return home.”20
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
Migration Watch
points to the different policies of the political parties on immigration.60
main issue is whether contributing to society as a worker for 3-4 years should automatically have a path leading to settlement.61
economic migration (note admittance that most do not migrate for work purposes) may benefit employers, but costly for taxpayers and sectors of the indigenous population.62
contra claims of contribution in taxes claims (1) year used 1999/2000 atypical in terms of overall government surplus (2) ignores costs of immigrants (3) unfair in that it compares young immigrants to an, in average, older indigenous population.63
remittances have a negative effect on foreign exchange.64
claims of immigrant contribution have underestimated their impact on population growth, especially children born in the UK.65 in another paper this is amended, Government treats UK born children of mixed marriages as UK children, MWUK would rather they were treated as half/half.66 Still maintain there is no net benefit when compared to existing population.67
Quotes M Wolffe “The desirability of sizeable immigration is a matter more of values than of economics. It is not a choice between wealth and poverty, but of the sort of country one desires to inhabit.”68
note fear of a “Back door” route into the UK, especially through (1) amnesty to illegals in other countries (2) fast access to citizenship/settlement, would prefer 10 years of residence.69
points to London receiving 65% of immigrants.70
complains about the excessive extensions granted to student visas, which it sees as another “back door” into the UK.71
Statistics on Brazilian students (new visas/extensions) 2001: 10700/3395 ....2002: 9700/4635....2003: 8840/753072
claims that with zero net migration only 30% of the current projected homes built on greenfield sites would need to be built.73
Disputes claims by IPPR that granting an amnesty to illegal immigrants would bring in £1 billion a year to the treasury claiming that the cost would actually be of £0.8-1.8 billion a year. Main arguments: 1) IPPR calculations do not include the various public funds that immigrants would have access to 2) IPPR calculations underestimated the number of immigrants but overestimated the number in employment and how much they are earning.74 [note however that MWUK do not factor in the cost of deporting the illegal immigrants]
Outlines the UK Borders Act of 2007, significant for 1) the power of deportation at ports 2) biometric ID for immigrants 3) automatic deportation of foreign criminals.75
suggests that confusion may arise because of changes in terminology.76 Because Home Office is not always able to send Presenting Officers to Immigration Appeals, proposes that judges be allowed a more inquisitorial role.77
“The internationally accepted United Nations definition of a migrant is someone who changes his or
her country of usual residence for a period of at least a year”78
60Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 51–54.
61Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
62Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
63Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
64Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
65Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
66Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
67Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
68Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 9.
69A Green, “Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs) – INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC MIGRATION TO THE EU” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_8_inquiry_into_economic_migration_to_the_eu.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
70Migrationwatch UK, “Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs on ‘The Economic Impact of Immigration’” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_18_Submission_to_Hof.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
71Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 1.
72Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 2.
73Migrationwatch UK, “The impact of immigration on housing in England” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Housing/7_9_Impact_of_Immigration_on_housing.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
74Migrationwatch UK, “THE TRUE COST OF AN AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_19_True_cost_of_Amnesty.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008].
75H Mitchell, “UK Borders Act 2007” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_21_UK_Borders_Act_07.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008]
76H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
77H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
78Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
main issue is whether contributing to society as a worker for 3-4 years should automatically have a path leading to settlement.61
economic migration (note admittance that most do not migrate for work purposes) may benefit employers, but costly for taxpayers and sectors of the indigenous population.62
contra claims of contribution in taxes claims (1) year used 1999/2000 atypical in terms of overall government surplus (2) ignores costs of immigrants (3) unfair in that it compares young immigrants to an, in average, older indigenous population.63
remittances have a negative effect on foreign exchange.64
claims of immigrant contribution have underestimated their impact on population growth, especially children born in the UK.65 in another paper this is amended, Government treats UK born children of mixed marriages as UK children, MWUK would rather they were treated as half/half.66 Still maintain there is no net benefit when compared to existing population.67
Quotes M Wolffe “The desirability of sizeable immigration is a matter more of values than of economics. It is not a choice between wealth and poverty, but of the sort of country one desires to inhabit.”68
note fear of a “Back door” route into the UK, especially through (1) amnesty to illegals in other countries (2) fast access to citizenship/settlement, would prefer 10 years of residence.69
points to London receiving 65% of immigrants.70
complains about the excessive extensions granted to student visas, which it sees as another “back door” into the UK.71
Statistics on Brazilian students (new visas/extensions) 2001: 10700/3395 ....2002: 9700/4635....2003: 8840/753072
claims that with zero net migration only 30% of the current projected homes built on greenfield sites would need to be built.73
Disputes claims by IPPR that granting an amnesty to illegal immigrants would bring in £1 billion a year to the treasury claiming that the cost would actually be of £0.8-1.8 billion a year. Main arguments: 1) IPPR calculations do not include the various public funds that immigrants would have access to 2) IPPR calculations underestimated the number of immigrants but overestimated the number in employment and how much they are earning.74 [note however that MWUK do not factor in the cost of deporting the illegal immigrants]
Outlines the UK Borders Act of 2007, significant for 1) the power of deportation at ports 2) biometric ID for immigrants 3) automatic deportation of foreign criminals.75
suggests that confusion may arise because of changes in terminology.76 Because Home Office is not always able to send Presenting Officers to Immigration Appeals, proposes that judges be allowed a more inquisitorial role.77
“The internationally accepted United Nations definition of a migrant is someone who changes his or
her country of usual residence for a period of at least a year”78
60Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 51–54.
61Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
62Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
63Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
64Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
65Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
66Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
67Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
68Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 9.
69A Green, “Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs) – INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC MIGRATION TO THE EU” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_8_inquiry_into_economic_migration_to_the_eu.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
70Migrationwatch UK, “Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs on ‘The Economic Impact of Immigration’” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_18_Submission_to_Hof.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
71Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 1.
72Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 2.
73Migrationwatch UK, “The impact of immigration on housing in England” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Housing/7_9_Impact_of_Immigration_on_housing.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
74Migrationwatch UK, “THE TRUE COST OF AN AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_19_True_cost_of_Amnesty.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008].
75H Mitchell, “UK Borders Act 2007” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_21_UK_Borders_Act_07.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008]
76H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
77H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
78Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
Thursday, 23 October 2008
Sris 2
Between 2000 and 2002 health service and IT were the main industries for which work permits were issued.1
difficulty in defining a “migrant” limitation in using the term “foreign-born” (which may include British citizens born overseas) and “foreign” (which may exclude migrants who take up citizenship).2
outline the existing paths, pre-point system, under which a migrant may come to the UK to work.3
migration, deal with labour and skills shortage, but on its own, not a sufficent measure to deal with ageing population.4
difficulty in defining a “migrant” limitation in using the term “foreign-born” (which may include British citizens born overseas) and “foreign” (which may exclude migrants who take up citizenship).2
outline the existing paths, pre-point system, under which a migrant may come to the UK to work.3
migration, deal with labour and skills shortage, but on its own, not a sufficent measure to deal with ageing population.4
Sris
Explain their use of the LFS (Labour force survey-a quarterly sampling of the Labour force) and some of its limitations.1
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Rutter
Addition of 2 million people to the foreign-born population resident in the UK.1 contrary to previous migration, this involves people from countries without historical ties to the UK and less familiar with the language, culture and practices.2 Since 1997 emergence of many new ethnic communities.3
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Nathan
Critiques the way that migration is often presented in terms of national benefits v local costs; argues that there is a lack of research on the long term impact of migration on local communities.1
uneven spread of migrants across Britain, concentration in large cities but increasing presence in rural areas.2
Key agencies (1) Home office (2) MAC- Migration Advisory Committee has the role of determining employer needs (3) MIF- Migration Impact Forum3
compared to other countries long term migration intake in the UK is low, yet short term migration flow is high, and becoming more significant than long term.4
migration leading to changes in both large and smaller urban areas with an increase in diversity.5
Three major effects of migration on local economies: 1) skills 2) diversity 3) size of population and of economy.6
employers like migrants: 1) “hard and soft skills” 2) “bring fresh ideas, approaches and experiences.”7
tendency for the “downgrading” of highly skilled migrants.8
In the long term migration expected to have little if no effect on wage and employment levels. In the short term impact may be reduced by migrants competing between themselves for jobs UK population do not want. Marginalisation of migrants may cause problems as this may encourage a “cheap labour” fix rather than an improvement in technology and in the skills of the existing workforce.9
Diversity 1) widens skill set 2) innovation 3) emergence of new markets, both in the country and overseas.10
migrants have a “housing footprint” that is below average due to the tendency to share accomodation.11
1M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
2M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
3M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
4M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
5M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
6M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 15.
7M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
8M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
9M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
10M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 20–22.
11M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
uneven spread of migrants across Britain, concentration in large cities but increasing presence in rural areas.2
Key agencies (1) Home office (2) MAC- Migration Advisory Committee has the role of determining employer needs (3) MIF- Migration Impact Forum3
compared to other countries long term migration intake in the UK is low, yet short term migration flow is high, and becoming more significant than long term.4
migration leading to changes in both large and smaller urban areas with an increase in diversity.5
Three major effects of migration on local economies: 1) skills 2) diversity 3) size of population and of economy.6
employers like migrants: 1) “hard and soft skills” 2) “bring fresh ideas, approaches and experiences.”7
tendency for the “downgrading” of highly skilled migrants.8
In the long term migration expected to have little if no effect on wage and employment levels. In the short term impact may be reduced by migrants competing between themselves for jobs UK population do not want. Marginalisation of migrants may cause problems as this may encourage a “cheap labour” fix rather than an improvement in technology and in the skills of the existing workforce.9
Diversity 1) widens skill set 2) innovation 3) emergence of new markets, both in the country and overseas.10
migrants have a “housing footprint” that is below average due to the tendency to share accomodation.11
1M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
2M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
3M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
4M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
5M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
6M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 15.
7M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
8M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
9M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
10M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 20–22.
11M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
Wednesday, 22 October 2008
Muir
Points to the challenge to the “relatively hands-off” approach Britain has traditionally taken in relation to identity and citizenship caused by the threat of terror and the impact of globalization.1
2006 Mori Poll 40% see immigration as a major issue.2
“Sociologists have found that while (contrary to much media speculation) segregation in the UK is not increasing, it does remain high for certain groups in certain parts of the country”3
claims that new identity politics has set itself as against multi-culturalism which is believed to have gone to far and to be responsible for segregation.4
involves a stress on local identity, seen as essential to promote community cohesion.5
social cohesion can be promoted through: (1) tackling discrimination 2) tackling social inequality; many tensions caused when those on low income have to compete for welfare 3) cultural change through shared action (to increase contact), shared values, essentially those of citizenship (through citizenship education/tests, etc...) and shared identities 6
Promoting shared identity seen to have the specific contribution of promoting emotional attachment and a sense of solidarity.7
“Promoting shared identities can be no substitute for the difficult task of reducing social and economic inequalities.”8
Process of promoting shared identity should not be seen as a substitute for multiculturalism, which is a way of respecting difference within common institutions.9
“Rather than focusing on the much contested concept of multiculturalism, those who worry about segregation might do better to focus on the wide array of structural factors that in some parts of the country have allowed parallel lives to develop. These include the housing market, school choice and the poverty and low levels of social mobility that are acute for many minority groups.”10
“It is much easier for new migrant communities to retain links with their homelands or fellow immigrants in other countries than was once the case. In this context the role of institutions such as the BBC or the mainstream press in helping to define our collective experience as a society is much weaker than it was in the past, when many more people watched the same programmes and read the same papers.”11
points to a celebration of democracy, multiculturalism, music, arts, sport and heritage as means of developing a more open sense of British identity.12
1R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
3R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
4R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
5R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 6.
6R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 7–8.
7R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 8–9.
8R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
9R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
10R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10
11R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 14.
12R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 15–16.
2006 Mori Poll 40% see immigration as a major issue.2
“Sociologists have found that while (contrary to much media speculation) segregation in the UK is not increasing, it does remain high for certain groups in certain parts of the country”3
claims that new identity politics has set itself as against multi-culturalism which is believed to have gone to far and to be responsible for segregation.4
involves a stress on local identity, seen as essential to promote community cohesion.5
social cohesion can be promoted through: (1) tackling discrimination 2) tackling social inequality; many tensions caused when those on low income have to compete for welfare 3) cultural change through shared action (to increase contact), shared values, essentially those of citizenship (through citizenship education/tests, etc...) and shared identities 6
Promoting shared identity seen to have the specific contribution of promoting emotional attachment and a sense of solidarity.7
“Promoting shared identities can be no substitute for the difficult task of reducing social and economic inequalities.”8
Process of promoting shared identity should not be seen as a substitute for multiculturalism, which is a way of respecting difference within common institutions.9
“Rather than focusing on the much contested concept of multiculturalism, those who worry about segregation might do better to focus on the wide array of structural factors that in some parts of the country have allowed parallel lives to develop. These include the housing market, school choice and the poverty and low levels of social mobility that are acute for many minority groups.”10
“It is much easier for new migrant communities to retain links with their homelands or fellow immigrants in other countries than was once the case. In this context the role of institutions such as the BBC or the mainstream press in helping to define our collective experience as a society is much weaker than it was in the past, when many more people watched the same programmes and read the same papers.”11
points to a celebration of democracy, multiculturalism, music, arts, sport and heritage as means of developing a more open sense of British identity.12
1R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
3R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
4R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
5R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 6.
6R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 7–8.
7R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 8–9.
8R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
9R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
10R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10
11R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 14.
12R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 15–16.
Hayes
Migration is courageous, yet stories of migrants are often ignored to justify restrictive controls.1
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
Fielding
Points to neo-liberal (ie free market) arguments against migration policies and libertarian arguments which see it as a breach of human rights.1
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.
Farrant et al
“Public concern about immigration in general is at unprecedented levels (MORI 2005), with a significant proportion of people polled recently feeling that the Government does not have immigration under control (MORI 2003).
Irregular migration is seen as an important public issue in several ways:
• as evidence that the immigration system is failing or being abused
• as a challenge to national sovereignty (that is, the UK may not have total control over who comes and goes from the country)
• as potentially compromising the security of the UK (especially in light of growing fears about international terrorism)
• as exposing some vulnerable migrants to exploitation, in transit or when they get to the UK. “1
define irregular migrants as those “liable to be deported for issues related to immigration status.”2 reasons 1) entry by avoiding controls 2) false documents 3) overstay 4) unreturned asylum seekers 5) lack of papers 6) failure in applying for asylum elsewhere.3
preference for term irregular as it captures complexity of issue and avoids connotation with criminality; irregulars have committed administrative offences and not serious crimes.4
compares use of “Irregular” “Illegal” “Undocumented” and “Unauthorised.”5
points out that the reasons for irregular migration are basically the same as those for regular migration; “it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity”6;
preference for the residual method of determining # of irregular migrants (subtracting from the total number of foreign born residents those entitled to be here legally) range of 310,000-570,000 with a median estimate of 430,000. Limitations 1) does not include all those liable to deportation (e..g. Over-working students) 2) census data out of date.7
points to the many dangerous routes of entry into the UK.8
irregular migrants concentrated in those jobs which are “difficult, dirty and dangerous” (and low-paid)9
“There are several different estimates regarding the scale of the informal economy in the UK. One average ‘guesstimate’ of its size is 6.8 per cent of GDP or £75 billion (Small Business Council 2005). While there may be short‐term fiscal advantages for both the individual and the employer in the informal economy, the broader social and economic costs are significant, ranging from a loss of social protection and rights, to increased taxpayers’ burden and limited business expansion”10 nonetheless irregulars may ensure that some jobs are done; or do not have prices pushed up dramatically.11
regularisation would involve a contribution of £485 million to over £1 billion a year to the exchequer.12
cost of deportation averages at £ 11,000 a case.13
more restrictive controls in which migrants find it more difficult to travel to and from between home country and host country may encourage permanence.14
“Immigration to the UK has been less permanent than is commonly thought: almost half (46 per cent) of all overseas‐born immigrants left the UK within five years of arrival between 1981 and 2002 (Office for National Statistics 2004).”15
Difficulty in defending human rights of irregulars as 1) Britain has no written constitution 2) irregulars excluded from many international conventions 3) Bringing a case to court involves exposure and the risk of deportation.16
compares the effect of different policies towards irregular migration.17
UK Policy: 1) historically a reliance on external border control, including carrier liability 2) a trend towards the use of internal controls e.g. Ids 3) reduce the demand for irregular labour through employer sanctions (on the whole ineffective so far) 4) increase the scope for regular migration [but is current points system a form of reversing this for low skilled labour] 5) long residence concession (discretionary for adults with 14 consecutive years and children with seven) 18 No current plans for a major regularisation programme.19
1M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 4.
2M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
3M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
4M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
5M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 6.
6M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 8.
7M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 9.
8M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 10.
9M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 11.
10M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
11M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
12M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
13M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
14M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
15M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
16M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 14.
17M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 15.
18M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
19M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
Irregular migration is seen as an important public issue in several ways:
• as evidence that the immigration system is failing or being abused
• as a challenge to national sovereignty (that is, the UK may not have total control over who comes and goes from the country)
• as potentially compromising the security of the UK (especially in light of growing fears about international terrorism)
• as exposing some vulnerable migrants to exploitation, in transit or when they get to the UK. “1
define irregular migrants as those “liable to be deported for issues related to immigration status.”2 reasons 1) entry by avoiding controls 2) false documents 3) overstay 4) unreturned asylum seekers 5) lack of papers 6) failure in applying for asylum elsewhere.3
preference for term irregular as it captures complexity of issue and avoids connotation with criminality; irregulars have committed administrative offences and not serious crimes.4
compares use of “Irregular” “Illegal” “Undocumented” and “Unauthorised.”5
points out that the reasons for irregular migration are basically the same as those for regular migration; “it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity”6;
preference for the residual method of determining # of irregular migrants (subtracting from the total number of foreign born residents those entitled to be here legally) range of 310,000-570,000 with a median estimate of 430,000. Limitations 1) does not include all those liable to deportation (e..g. Over-working students) 2) census data out of date.7
points to the many dangerous routes of entry into the UK.8
irregular migrants concentrated in those jobs which are “difficult, dirty and dangerous” (and low-paid)9
“There are several different estimates regarding the scale of the informal economy in the UK. One average ‘guesstimate’ of its size is 6.8 per cent of GDP or £75 billion (Small Business Council 2005). While there may be short‐term fiscal advantages for both the individual and the employer in the informal economy, the broader social and economic costs are significant, ranging from a loss of social protection and rights, to increased taxpayers’ burden and limited business expansion”10 nonetheless irregulars may ensure that some jobs are done; or do not have prices pushed up dramatically.11
regularisation would involve a contribution of £485 million to over £1 billion a year to the exchequer.12
cost of deportation averages at £ 11,000 a case.13
more restrictive controls in which migrants find it more difficult to travel to and from between home country and host country may encourage permanence.14
“Immigration to the UK has been less permanent than is commonly thought: almost half (46 per cent) of all overseas‐born immigrants left the UK within five years of arrival between 1981 and 2002 (Office for National Statistics 2004).”15
Difficulty in defending human rights of irregulars as 1) Britain has no written constitution 2) irregulars excluded from many international conventions 3) Bringing a case to court involves exposure and the risk of deportation.16
compares the effect of different policies towards irregular migration.17
UK Policy: 1) historically a reliance on external border control, including carrier liability 2) a trend towards the use of internal controls e.g. Ids 3) reduce the demand for irregular labour through employer sanctions (on the whole ineffective so far) 4) increase the scope for regular migration [but is current points system a form of reversing this for low skilled labour] 5) long residence concession (discretionary for adults with 14 consecutive years and children with seven) 18 No current plans for a major regularisation programme.19
1M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 4.
2M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
3M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
4M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
5M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 6.
6M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 8.
7M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 9.
8M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 10.
9M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 11.
10M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
11M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
12M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
13M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
14M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
15M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
16M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 14.
17M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 15.
18M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
19M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
Dustmann
Large proportion of working immigrants are recent arrivals, 8% arrived in the last year, one third in the last 10.1
points to an increasing diversity in the country of origin of immigrants.2
“He ¯nds that immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than UK-born individuals with similar levels of skills. Borjas explains these results with what he calls enclave effects: Immigrants create enclaves by concentrating in geographical areas. Such enclaves then provide self-employment opportunities for other members of the respective national group. In these enclaves UK-born individuals lack knowledge of language and preferences of potential customers and have therefore a disadvantage when competing for the same self-employment opportunities.”3
“When computing the effect of language prffciency on the employment and wage gap between UK-born individuals and ethnic minority immigrants, the study concludes that lan-guage largely reduces differences in both economic outcomes.”4
claim that it is difficult to quantify the impact of immigration on the employment and wages of the resident population (1) on unemployment no clear evidence of adverse effect, some indication of increased unemployment but so small to be statistically insignificant (2) on wages, some indication of higher wages.5
1C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19.
2C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19–20.
3C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 41.
4C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 57.
5C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, The Local Labour Market Effects of Immigration in the UK, Home Office Online Report 06/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.p , 4–7.
points to an increasing diversity in the country of origin of immigrants.2
“He ¯nds that immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than UK-born individuals with similar levels of skills. Borjas explains these results with what he calls enclave effects: Immigrants create enclaves by concentrating in geographical areas. Such enclaves then provide self-employment opportunities for other members of the respective national group. In these enclaves UK-born individuals lack knowledge of language and preferences of potential customers and have therefore a disadvantage when competing for the same self-employment opportunities.”3
“When computing the effect of language prffciency on the employment and wage gap between UK-born individuals and ethnic minority immigrants, the study concludes that lan-guage largely reduces differences in both economic outcomes.”4
claim that it is difficult to quantify the impact of immigration on the employment and wages of the resident population (1) on unemployment no clear evidence of adverse effect, some indication of increased unemployment but so small to be statistically insignificant (2) on wages, some indication of higher wages.5
1C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19.
2C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19–20.
3C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 41.
4C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 57.
5C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, The Local Labour Market Effects of Immigration in the UK, Home Office Online Report 06/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.p , 4–7.
Dench
Makes the point that a worker in a low-skilled job is not necessarily low skilled themselves.1 Points system to simplify the 50 ways one can enter the UK to work and study into one manageable system.2
explanation of current work permit scheme.3
EU enlargement seen to reduce the need for non-EEA migration of low skilled workers.4
students the largest category of people entering the UK eligible to work.5
reasons for hiring migrants 1) fill vacancies 2) willingness to work outside of regular hours 3) reputation for being hard working and efficient (esp. illegals)6
concentration of migrants in low-skilled jobs linked to the likelihood that they would stay.7
despite (or maybe because of?) tensions, migrant workers help to increase productivity of other workers.8
“Other respondents had experience of Brazilians masquerading as Portuguese, who were also exposed by fellow workers. It was commented that Portuguese can tell the difference between fellow expatriates and Brazilians, and that they resent these impostors.”9
exploitation of illegal migrants 1) lower pay 2) same pay but larger deductions (e.g. Accomodation costs) 3) long hours.10
difficulty for migrant workers to open accounts, many are charged by third-parties to allow access to accounts.11
1S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
2S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
3S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 4.
4S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 5.
5S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 14.
6S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 16–17.
7S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 25.
8S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 35.
9S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 62.
10S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 63.
11S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 64.s
explanation of current work permit scheme.3
EU enlargement seen to reduce the need for non-EEA migration of low skilled workers.4
students the largest category of people entering the UK eligible to work.5
reasons for hiring migrants 1) fill vacancies 2) willingness to work outside of regular hours 3) reputation for being hard working and efficient (esp. illegals)6
concentration of migrants in low-skilled jobs linked to the likelihood that they would stay.7
despite (or maybe because of?) tensions, migrant workers help to increase productivity of other workers.8
“Other respondents had experience of Brazilians masquerading as Portuguese, who were also exposed by fellow workers. It was commented that Portuguese can tell the difference between fellow expatriates and Brazilians, and that they resent these impostors.”9
exploitation of illegal migrants 1) lower pay 2) same pay but larger deductions (e.g. Accomodation costs) 3) long hours.10
difficulty for migrant workers to open accounts, many are charged by third-parties to allow access to accounts.11
1S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
2S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
3S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 4.
4S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 5.
5S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 14.
6S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 16–17.
7S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 25.
8S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 35.
9S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 62.
10S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 63.
11S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 64.s
Colley et al
Built upon a year long research by Gott and Johnston (Home Office) but increase it to cover a 5 year period. Also rather than comment on the net value of immigrants, compare relative contribution of migrants and non-migrants. Re typical objections 1) It is wrong to assign cost of immigration services to immigrants themselves as much of the rational of the Immigration system is to benefit UK population not immigrants...
“A simple example illustrates the problems inherent in apportioning the entire cost of the immigration system to immigrants themselves: if the government were to operate a ‘closed-door’ policy towards immigration (that is to say, not allow anyone enter the country on a permanent basis) then the costs of policing such a system would be enormous, but there would be no immigrants to assign this cost to. Conversely, if the government were to operate an ‘open-door’policy, then the costs are likely to fall while immigration may increase. Some of the costs of administering the immigration system (such as the employment of immigration officials at ports and airports) are unlikely to fall significantly even with reductions of immigration levels. On the other hand, some of the variable costs of the system are increasingly being recovered through user-charging of migrants and their prospective employers (through fees for work permits). This means that second-guessing which portion of the immigration system is for the benefit of the UK-born and which part is for immigrants is a difficult and potentially futile exercise.”1
Re issue of pension costs of migrants, this ignores that much contemporary migration is temporary in nature.2 3) re: issue of pressure on public services, reminder that migrants are disproportionately represented in the provision of public services.3
NAFI (net annual fiscal contribution, i.e. What is paid in taxes- what is received from government)
Immigrants>UK population. Hence, when there is a budget surplus, immigrants contribute more than UK population, when there is a budget deficit, immigrants receive less.4 (not commented in the paper, but this would be even more accentuated in those groups where there are little if no asylum seekers, thus Brazilians, for asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and thus pay tax, yet receive limited benefits)
1D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
2D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
3D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
4D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
c
“A simple example illustrates the problems inherent in apportioning the entire cost of the immigration system to immigrants themselves: if the government were to operate a ‘closed-door’ policy towards immigration (that is to say, not allow anyone enter the country on a permanent basis) then the costs of policing such a system would be enormous, but there would be no immigrants to assign this cost to. Conversely, if the government were to operate an ‘open-door’policy, then the costs are likely to fall while immigration may increase. Some of the costs of administering the immigration system (such as the employment of immigration officials at ports and airports) are unlikely to fall significantly even with reductions of immigration levels. On the other hand, some of the variable costs of the system are increasingly being recovered through user-charging of migrants and their prospective employers (through fees for work permits). This means that second-guessing which portion of the immigration system is for the benefit of the UK-born and which part is for immigrants is a difficult and potentially futile exercise.”1
Re issue of pension costs of migrants, this ignores that much contemporary migration is temporary in nature.2 3) re: issue of pressure on public services, reminder that migrants are disproportionately represented in the provision of public services.3
NAFI (net annual fiscal contribution, i.e. What is paid in taxes- what is received from government)
Immigrants>UK population. Hence, when there is a budget surplus, immigrants contribute more than UK population, when there is a budget deficit, immigrants receive less.4 (not commented in the paper, but this would be even more accentuated in those groups where there are little if no asylum seekers, thus Brazilians, for asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and thus pay tax, yet receive limited benefits)
1D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
2D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
3D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
4D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
c
Chappell
Points out that migration is both affected and affects development.1 Figure 1 “The Development-Migration-Development Nexus”2 Table outlines the development impact of migration on country of origin in different areas.3
1L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
3L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 9–12.
1L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
3L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 9–12.
Wednesday, 1 October 2008
Moxon
claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
Wednesday, 24 September 2008
Lester
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points to the rise of the ethnic minority population in the post WW2 period, especially in the 1950s and the need in the 1960s to adjust to the reality of a multiracial society.1
“Britain's newcomers have rarely failed to make a positive contribution out of proportion to their numbers, in founding and rejuvenating business firms, in contributing to our national welfare and prosperity, and in enriching our universities and cultural centres.”2
points to the need to rethink the concept of Britishness in the light of ethnic minorities.3
Immigration measures, and Parliamentary and media response, weaken the endeavours of the CRE to end racial discrimination.4
1A Lester, “From Legislation to Integration: Twenty Years of the Race Relations Act” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 22–35, 23.
2A Lester, “From Legislation to Integration: Twenty Years of the Race Relations Act” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 22–35, 24.
3A Lester, “From Legislation to Integration: Twenty Years of the Race Relations Act” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 22–35, 28.
4A Lester, “From Legislation to Integration: Twenty Years of the Race Relations Act” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 22–35, 28.
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
CCME
“A report published in 2004 by the UK House of Commons2 clearly shows that the costs of migration are outweighed by the economic benefit migration brings. Therefore the Commission’s initiative is a good starting point for a shift of paradigm in the political debate. Migration should no longer be regarded as an indication of crisis and deficit but as a chance and resource for the countries of origin as well as for the hosting societies.”1
“people migrating for reasons of labour, usually as a main priority, seek thereby to improve their own life and the lives of their families ... come with individual hopes, challenges and skills, interests, and inalienable human rights...Migration can be a source of income and the unofficial social security system for the families of migrants. Moreover, migration contributes to increased knowledge and in some cases improves the economic standing of a country. In other cases it might completely deprive the country of its most needed skilled or highly skilled labour.”2
Links migration to the unequal impact of globalization.3
“The point to be taken from this is that migration in the modern world, in both its forced and ‘voluntary’ versions, has to be understood as arising for many people as an act of necessary adaptation to developments beyond their individual control. In many instances, people migrate in order to ensure their basic survival; in others, because the task of living with a degree of dignity and the hope for a marginally better future requires movement to another country.”4
points to the fact that actions designed to combat terrorism affect the issue of remittances.5
“approaches the issue of migration as one of “service providers”. This logic in our view raises strong concerns about a perspective, which exclusively sees migrants as a workforce, but hardly as human beings with hopes, plans, dreams and, foremost: rights.”6
points to the disaster of the guest worker system in the 1970s and claims that immigration policy needs to take into consideration that whether people stay or return often has little link to their initial intentions.7
1Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
2Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
3Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
4Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 3.
5Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 4.
6Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 6.
7Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 7.
Jackson
"A European identity that is solely identified with the European Union, the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of peoples only within the internal market, or the tightening of external border controls, is an identity that deepens an ‘Us’/‘Other’ dichotomy"1
"Europe’s historical and recent experience of nationalisms should be sufficient warning against the dangers of defining ourselves in opposition to who we are not."2(10)
suggests that essentialist definitions of national identity tend to be mythological--"These essentialist understandings of Europe fail to take into account our own shared history of ‘barbarism’, restriction of civil liberties, or of an earlier version of Europe founded in Greek’s classical version of democracy (which incidentally excluded women and slaves)" 3(10)
points to the inconsistency of the term "migrant" 4(10-11)
"It is currently estimated that 1.5 million migrants arrive and settle in the EU each yeaR The same estimates also suggest that seven million migrants within the EU have irregular status with a further half a million of these arriving each yeaR In total, 4% of the EU population, or 18.5 million people, is made up of non-EU citizens"5 (11)
o
"Philip Putnam recently wrote that, “In the short to medium run… immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital.” [2] Yet he goes on to describe the social capital that develops in communities where social and cultural diversities have stimulated mutual enrichment and more encompassing identities. "6 (11)
o
"Franco Frattini takes the view that, "There can be no immigration without integration"7 (11)
o
"MR Frattini is sufficiently pragmatic to understand that Europe’s workplaces and pension funds will increasingly rely on economically productive young people from the new EU member states as well as those from Africa and Asia."8 (11)
o
"Net migration to the UK hit 400,000 in 2005 - almost double the level in 2004" 9(11)
o
"I simply want to stress here that the discourse of integration fails to address the question of the lack of internal integration." 10(12)
o
Reflects on the reasons that Christian migrants come to Europe and then alerts:
"However, the indigenous churches of Europe should take careful note of research conducted by Vitoria University in Spain during March 2005. The results were based on more than 500 interviews with immigrants from over 30 different countries. 85% said they believed in God, but this was a decrease from 99% for those who said that they had believed in God when they first arrived in Spain. Of those interviewed, some 15% had abandoned belief in God and a further 10% were in the process of losing it. Only a small percentage, 5.8%, reported experiencing their faith grow."11 (12)
o
"What emerges quite clearly, is that more regular church attendance tends to correlate with more positive attitudes towards migrant peoples." 12(12)
1 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
2 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
3 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
4 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10–11 [available Redcliffe site]
5 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
6 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
7 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
8 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
9 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
10 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
11 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
12 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
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