Claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
negative focus on Asian enclaves, especially those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.20
defends Ron Atkinsons use of “nigger” to refer to Desailly, and other expressions such as “Paki” and “Wog.” In part based upon the use of derogatory terms for whites by other ethnic groups.21
complains about anti-white racism, especially “mugging” which he presents as a black hate crime against whites.22
denies that there was any significant immigrant component to the British population prior to the post WWII period.23
denies any significant link between immigration and colonialism24 (argues that British wealth came from Industrial revolution not empire; but does not deal with impact of Empire on former colonies)
points to the lack of investigation in the case of student visas, suggests this is a form of coming in as an economic migrant.25
criticism of the impact of immigrants, on the NHS, especially those who come specifically for treatment.26
“poor whites at all levels strongly dislike immigration...there is another section of the population that consistently feels most antagonized of all... 'Middle Englanders' who are neither poor nor well-off”27
hostility of ME-s to immigrants who have no cultural background in the country yet benefit from the welfare system.28
“Mori found that satisfaction with local government had a very strong inverse relation to the proportion of ethnic minorities in an area.”29
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
20S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 97–113.
21S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 114–128.
22S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 128–132.
23S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135.
24S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135–137.
25S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 140–145.
26S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 175–187.
27S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 199.
28S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 200–201.
29S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 202.
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Statistics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Statistics. Show all posts
Tuesday, 25 November 2008
migration watch
“he years 1991 – 2006 there was a net movement of some 2.3 million people to the UK - only 8% of which came from the new East European members of the EU”1
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
Migration Watch UK
“Balanced Migration... is based on a simple principle: that the number of immigrants who are given permission to settle permanently in this country should be kept to approximately the same level as the number of British citizens who are emigrating. We are not seeking to reduce the number of people who come to work here for a few years and return home.”20
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
Migration Watch
First source of data is the Office of National Statistics International Migration Estimates. This is based on the International Passenger Survey which is a small voluntary sample of migration. Main weaknesses, (1) does not include land entry and smaller airports (2) does not include asylum seekers (3) is based on the declared intention of passengers which is not a clear guide. ONS seeks to correct some of these limitations. 2005 Estimate, net international migration of 185,000.79
Second source is the Settlement Data enumerating those granted indefinite leave to remain.80 Third source of data is the census.81
international migration to places where there are already existing ethnic minorities.82 London preferred area with 750,000 coming between 1993-2002.83 Balanced by the departure of white residents, especially young couples with children; increase in commuting.84 Higher the presence of ethnic minorities, higher the departure of white population.85 Brent white population declined from 136,600 in 1991 to 122,400 in 2001.86 Claims that this process leads to the separation of the white population from the ethnic minorities, and makes the integration of immigrants more difficult.87
2003 18.6% of births to mothers not from UK compared to 12.1% in 1993.88 (reached near 20% in 2004)89Outer London 41%; Brent 65% Greater London 47%90 2004: Births to foreign-born mothers are concentrated in particular areas. In Greater London as a whole the percentage is 49% (Inner London 57%, Outer London 43%) and the following London boroughs have 60% or more of births to foreign-born mothers:
Brent 68%
Camden 61%
Haringey 60%
Kensington and Chelsea 67%
Newham 71%
Tower Hamlets 69%91
MWUK claim that their stance is that immigration policy should reflect UK needs contra IPPR “apparent stance” that social policy should adapt to immigration trends.92
proposes tighter rules to discourage intercontinental marriage.93
“It is relevant to the UK that those granted amnesty in the EU will eventually obtain
documents that will permit them to travel to Britain. In Spain, anyone who has held a
resident permit for ten years can apply for Spanish nationality; for nationals of Latin
American countries and the Philippines, the qualifying period is only two years.”94
“It was also claimed that £4.7 billion would be “saved” by not undertaking their
forced removal. Nobody is suggesting such a course. One might just as well suggest
that we can “save” £100 billion by not sending a man to the moon!”95
Rather than removal suggest (1) stricter control on entry (2) stricter control on labour market (3) use of ID cards to deter from use of NHS and granting children access to school. (does not deal with human rights issue...nor the costs of these stricter controls.)96
79Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1–3.
80Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
81Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
82Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
83Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
84Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
85Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
86Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
87Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 7.
88Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
89Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
90Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
91Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
92Migrationwatch UK, “IPPR Report- Beyond Black and White” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_18_IPPR_report.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
93Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
94Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
95Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
96Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 6.
Second source is the Settlement Data enumerating those granted indefinite leave to remain.80 Third source of data is the census.81
international migration to places where there are already existing ethnic minorities.82 London preferred area with 750,000 coming between 1993-2002.83 Balanced by the departure of white residents, especially young couples with children; increase in commuting.84 Higher the presence of ethnic minorities, higher the departure of white population.85 Brent white population declined from 136,600 in 1991 to 122,400 in 2001.86 Claims that this process leads to the separation of the white population from the ethnic minorities, and makes the integration of immigrants more difficult.87
2003 18.6% of births to mothers not from UK compared to 12.1% in 1993.88 (reached near 20% in 2004)89Outer London 41%; Brent 65% Greater London 47%90 2004: Births to foreign-born mothers are concentrated in particular areas. In Greater London as a whole the percentage is 49% (Inner London 57%, Outer London 43%) and the following London boroughs have 60% or more of births to foreign-born mothers:
Brent 68%
Camden 61%
Haringey 60%
Kensington and Chelsea 67%
Newham 71%
Tower Hamlets 69%91
MWUK claim that their stance is that immigration policy should reflect UK needs contra IPPR “apparent stance” that social policy should adapt to immigration trends.92
proposes tighter rules to discourage intercontinental marriage.93
“It is relevant to the UK that those granted amnesty in the EU will eventually obtain
documents that will permit them to travel to Britain. In Spain, anyone who has held a
resident permit for ten years can apply for Spanish nationality; for nationals of Latin
American countries and the Philippines, the qualifying period is only two years.”94
“It was also claimed that £4.7 billion would be “saved” by not undertaking their
forced removal. Nobody is suggesting such a course. One might just as well suggest
that we can “save” £100 billion by not sending a man to the moon!”95
Rather than removal suggest (1) stricter control on entry (2) stricter control on labour market (3) use of ID cards to deter from use of NHS and granting children access to school. (does not deal with human rights issue...nor the costs of these stricter controls.)96
79Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1–3.
80Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
81Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
82Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
83Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
84Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
85Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
86Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
87Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 7.
88Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
89Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
90Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
91Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
92Migrationwatch UK, “IPPR Report- Beyond Black and White” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_18_IPPR_report.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
93Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
94Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
95Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
96Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 6.
Tuesday, 4 November 2008
Datta Work
Claims London is increasingly characterised by inequality in the labour market, especially with the expansion of lowly paid jobs occupied by migrants.1 suggest that these migrants keep London going by their presence in the “public reproductive and services sector”2
“The most recent, and perhaps most contested in terms of definition, has been a focus on
transnationalism and transmigration. This approach stresses the interconnections and networks
developed among migrant groups between source and destinations areas and how social, cultural
and economic fields often become transnational in nature”3
Britain “neo-liberal” policies: 1) decline in manufacturing 2) expansion of service industry, both in the banking, finance and creative industries, and in the low paid jobs 3) less secure employment for low paid jobs through subcontracting, agency staffing and temporary employment 4) decline in trade union power 5) creation of a “migrant division of labour”4 London: 1 in 7 workers under £5.8 an hour threshold; 1 in 5 under £6.7 an hour threshold.5
“Many of those in the lower echelons of the labour market are migrants. Indeed, London receives
around one-third of all migrants to the UK and it is estimated that between 1975 and 2000, some
450,000 migrants migrated to London (Hamnett, 2003). Furthermore, many of these migrants were
recent arrivals. Drawing on the latest Labour Survey Force (2002/2003) and the 2001 UK Census,
Spence (2005) notes that out of the 2 million Londoners born outside of the UK, 23% arrived in
this country before 1970, and 45% arrived after 1990. The ethnic profile of migrants is also diverse
with Whites constituting the largest group (40%), followed by Asians (27%) and Blacks (20%).
Also significant is that the majority of London’s migrants come from the Global South (70%), with
India, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, Pakistan and Kenya providing the largest groups. Migrants
now account for 35% of the working age population and 29% of the total population in the capital
(ibid). Furthermore, these figures do not account for informal workers, including undocumented
migrants, so that the true size of the economically active migrant workforce is likely to be higher
than that reported officially”6
“London migrants have much lower employment rates (65%) than Londoners born in the UK (78%),
although migrants from developing countries show lower employment rates (61%) than those from
developed economies (75%); the latter are more likely to work in professional and managerial
occupations, while the former are concentrated in services and especially the hotel and restaurant
sectors. Moreover, migrants constitute 46% of all workers in typically low-paid ‘elementary’
occupations, such as labourers, postal workers, porters, catering staff and cleaners. People from
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and South Asia often find it especially hard to
secure well-paid work, even if arriving in the UK with good skills and high level qualifications”7
Migrant acceptance of jobs which do not match their educational qualifications, with nearly half of those sampled having “tertiary level qualifications.”8 often involves a sense of loss of dignity.9
income maximisation achieved through working long hours, including overtime at normal rates of pay, with implications on leisure and family time. Students often forced to exceed the 20 hours limitations on their work.10 extra jobs taken on, especially in catering and cleaning.11 continuous changing between jobs.12 very low up take of state benefits, even in cases where migrants were eligible.13
multi-earner households, and restriction on consumption patterns.14
household sharing and reduction in utility bills.15
use of networks to share information about work, tendency of managers/supervisors to employ workers from a similar background.16 use of networks to share information about housing and cheap consumption patterns.17
ethnic identity and ethnic networks acting as a barrier to encourage a “migrant” identity/solidarity.18
hostility between different ethnic groups, increased with A8 accession.19
“The existence of such exclusion on ethnic based grounds and the existence of fractured or
‘perverse’ social capital potentially undermines the creation of community-based coping strategies
on class-based grounds.”20
“However, despite these divisions, from an organisational point of view, it appears that faith-based
organisations are potentially the most appropriate fora through which trade unions and migrant
groups can organise to address and overcome the exploitative conditions of work in global cities
like London”21
1K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 1.
2K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 1.
3K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 2.
4K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 3–4.
5K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 6.
6K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 7.
7K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 7.
8K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 10.
9K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 11.
10K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 11–12.
11K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 12–13.
12K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 13.
13K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 14–15.
14K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 15–16.
15K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 16–17.
16K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 17.
17K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 18.
18K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 19.
19K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 19–20.
20K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 20.
21K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 22.
“The most recent, and perhaps most contested in terms of definition, has been a focus on
transnationalism and transmigration. This approach stresses the interconnections and networks
developed among migrant groups between source and destinations areas and how social, cultural
and economic fields often become transnational in nature”3
Britain “neo-liberal” policies: 1) decline in manufacturing 2) expansion of service industry, both in the banking, finance and creative industries, and in the low paid jobs 3) less secure employment for low paid jobs through subcontracting, agency staffing and temporary employment 4) decline in trade union power 5) creation of a “migrant division of labour”4 London: 1 in 7 workers under £5.8 an hour threshold; 1 in 5 under £6.7 an hour threshold.5
“Many of those in the lower echelons of the labour market are migrants. Indeed, London receives
around one-third of all migrants to the UK and it is estimated that between 1975 and 2000, some
450,000 migrants migrated to London (Hamnett, 2003). Furthermore, many of these migrants were
recent arrivals. Drawing on the latest Labour Survey Force (2002/2003) and the 2001 UK Census,
Spence (2005) notes that out of the 2 million Londoners born outside of the UK, 23% arrived in
this country before 1970, and 45% arrived after 1990. The ethnic profile of migrants is also diverse
with Whites constituting the largest group (40%), followed by Asians (27%) and Blacks (20%).
Also significant is that the majority of London’s migrants come from the Global South (70%), with
India, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Nigeria, Pakistan and Kenya providing the largest groups. Migrants
now account for 35% of the working age population and 29% of the total population in the capital
(ibid). Furthermore, these figures do not account for informal workers, including undocumented
migrants, so that the true size of the economically active migrant workforce is likely to be higher
than that reported officially”6
“London migrants have much lower employment rates (65%) than Londoners born in the UK (78%),
although migrants from developing countries show lower employment rates (61%) than those from
developed economies (75%); the latter are more likely to work in professional and managerial
occupations, while the former are concentrated in services and especially the hotel and restaurant
sectors. Moreover, migrants constitute 46% of all workers in typically low-paid ‘elementary’
occupations, such as labourers, postal workers, porters, catering staff and cleaners. People from
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe and South Asia often find it especially hard to
secure well-paid work, even if arriving in the UK with good skills and high level qualifications”7
Migrant acceptance of jobs which do not match their educational qualifications, with nearly half of those sampled having “tertiary level qualifications.”8 often involves a sense of loss of dignity.9
income maximisation achieved through working long hours, including overtime at normal rates of pay, with implications on leisure and family time. Students often forced to exceed the 20 hours limitations on their work.10 extra jobs taken on, especially in catering and cleaning.11 continuous changing between jobs.12 very low up take of state benefits, even in cases where migrants were eligible.13
multi-earner households, and restriction on consumption patterns.14
household sharing and reduction in utility bills.15
use of networks to share information about work, tendency of managers/supervisors to employ workers from a similar background.16 use of networks to share information about housing and cheap consumption patterns.17
ethnic identity and ethnic networks acting as a barrier to encourage a “migrant” identity/solidarity.18
hostility between different ethnic groups, increased with A8 accession.19
“The existence of such exclusion on ethnic based grounds and the existence of fractured or
‘perverse’ social capital potentially undermines the creation of community-based coping strategies
on class-based grounds.”20
“However, despite these divisions, from an organisational point of view, it appears that faith-based
organisations are potentially the most appropriate fora through which trade unions and migrant
groups can organise to address and overcome the exploitative conditions of work in global cities
like London”21
1K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 1.
2K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 1.
3K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 2.
4K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 3–4.
5K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 6.
6K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 7.
7K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 7.
8K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 10.
9K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 11.
10K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 11–12.
11K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 12–13.
12K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 13.
13K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 14–15.
14K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 15–16.
15K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 16–17.
16K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 17.
17K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 18.
18K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 19.
19K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 19–20.
20K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 20.
21K Datta, C Mcllwaine, Y Evans, J Herbert, J May & J Willis, Work And Survival Strategies among Low-Paid Care Migrants in London, (London: Queen Mary University of London, 2006) available online at www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/globalcities/reports/docs/working_paper_3.pdf , 22.
Thursday, 23 October 2008
Woodbridge
Does not include in his definition those who have a legal right to remain but have breached the condition (e.g. By working) unless their right to remain has been revoked.1
points to adaptation made to the North American residual method to apply to the UK.2 claims that emigration is more common in the first two years of arrival in the UK.3
“The unauthorised resident population in the UK in April 2001 has a central estimate of 430,000, and a
range (based on taking all the most extreme assumptions discussed in Annex 3) of 310,000 to
570,000. These 430,000 unauthorised immigrants living in the UK in 2001 constituted 0.7 per cent of
the total UK population of 59 million. This compares to seven million unauthorised migrants in January
2000 in the US,9 2.5 per cent of the total US population of just over 281 million, using the same
method. The comparison is especially positive for the UK when one considers that the US
unauthorised population has been reduced by amnesties.”4
1J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 1.
2J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 2–4.
3J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 4.
4J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 5.
points to adaptation made to the North American residual method to apply to the UK.2 claims that emigration is more common in the first two years of arrival in the UK.3
“The unauthorised resident population in the UK in April 2001 has a central estimate of 430,000, and a
range (based on taking all the most extreme assumptions discussed in Annex 3) of 310,000 to
570,000. These 430,000 unauthorised immigrants living in the UK in 2001 constituted 0.7 per cent of
the total UK population of 59 million. This compares to seven million unauthorised migrants in January
2000 in the US,9 2.5 per cent of the total US population of just over 281 million, using the same
method. The comparison is especially positive for the UK when one considers that the US
unauthorised population has been reduced by amnesties.”4
1J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 1.
2J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 2–4.
3J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 4.
4J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 5.
White
“The influxes of labour which started during the years of economic reconstruction, and which later developed into family movement, have created whole communities of ethnic minorities in most large European cities.”1
difficulties of enumeration include clandestine migration, the issue of definition, especially when migrants are citizens of the country they are going to.2
migration of indigineous population to the suburbs increases impact of migration on cities.3
housing circumstances reflects the status and culture of the migrants, and the attitude of those who are powerful in the housing sector.4
London issue of exploitation of immigrant residents in slum property by landlords, often of similar ethnic origin in the 1960s.5
points to the fact that segregation may be a defensive approach of the migrants themselves, or part of a housing strategy.6
refers to a tendency towards dispersal rather than segregation; but uncertain whether it will remain.7
1P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 65.
2P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
3P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
4P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 68.
5P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 70.
6P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 71–72.
7P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 73.
difficulties of enumeration include clandestine migration, the issue of definition, especially when migrants are citizens of the country they are going to.2
migration of indigineous population to the suburbs increases impact of migration on cities.3
housing circumstances reflects the status and culture of the migrants, and the attitude of those who are powerful in the housing sector.4
London issue of exploitation of immigrant residents in slum property by landlords, often of similar ethnic origin in the 1960s.5
points to the fact that segregation may be a defensive approach of the migrants themselves, or part of a housing strategy.6
refers to a tendency towards dispersal rather than segregation; but uncertain whether it will remain.7
1P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 65.
2P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
3P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
4P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 68.
5P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 70.
6P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 71–72.
7P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 73.
Sris
Explain their use of the LFS (Labour force survey-a quarterly sampling of the Labour force) and some of its limitations.1
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Rutter
Addition of 2 million people to the foreign-born population resident in the UK.1 contrary to previous migration, this involves people from countries without historical ties to the UK and less familiar with the language, culture and practices.2 Since 1997 emergence of many new ethnic communities.3
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
Mason
Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000168 EndHTML:0000008549 StartFragment:0000000805 EndFragment:0000008532
One aspect of immigration from the New Commonwealth was to aid the reconstruction process. Another was that in this period there “was a growing demand for skilled workers in emergent sectors” so that as British workers gained upward mobility gaps in “unskilled and routine semi-skilled jobs at the lower levels of the labour market” appeared especially in “declining industries where cheap labour was a substitute for capital investment or an alternative to collapse.”1
1905 Aliens Act (essentially a response to Jewish migration) sought to manage the entry of foreigners although not vigorously applied “Its main significance lay in the fact that it represented a breach of the longstanding principle...that entry to Britain should be open”. Further legislation emerged with the imminence of the First World War which “gave the Home Secretary powers to exclude or deport those thought undesirable and introduced a requirement of registration with the police.”2
New Commonwealth immigrants occupied the least desirable jobs and housing.3 Social strains emerged.4
Voucher system established in the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.5
Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, in introducing the principle of patriality to thrawrt the arrival of East African Asians had the unworded intention of discriminating according to colour.6
Work permit system established in the 1971 Immigration Act established “a practical limitation on their ability to challenge poor working conditions or to involve themselves in any kind of political or trade union activity.”7
1991 ethnic minorities at 3 million, 5.5% of the population.8 4 million born outside of the UK.9
tendency for spatial concentration of ethnic minorities.10 See table by district.11
“immigration controls introduced from 1962 onwards was increasingly to exclude potential migrants who were not white...colour other than white might arouse suspicions about citizenship status.”12
“attempts to prevent illegal entry have frequently extended beyond ports of entry, into the wider community....the subtle message received by many of Britain's minority ethnic citizens is that they are second class citizens.”13
1D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 23.
2D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 24.
3D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.
4D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.
5D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 26.
6D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 27.
7D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 28.
8D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 32–33.
9D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 37.
10D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 35.
11D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 36.
12D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 123.
13D Mason, Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain, Second Edition, Oxford Modern Britain Series, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 124.
Congdon
P Congdon, “An Analysis of Population and Social Change in London Wards in the 1980s” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 14:4 (1989) 478-491
“The most distinctive feature of the 1980s is the cessation of the high population losses which occurred in many parts of inner London in the 1970s (Champion and Congdon, 1988). Instead a population revival as a result both of net migration gain (or reduced migration loss) and increased natural gain has occurred”1
““Figure 4 of the general fertility rate in 1981-87 shows the highest levels to occur in working class areas of inner London, especially those with large ethnic minorities. The ethnic group differ- ential is also apparent in high fertility in those parts of outer west London (in Ealing and Hounslow) with large Asian communities”2
1P Congdon, “An Analysis of Population and Social Change in London Wards in the 1980s” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 14:4 (1989) 478-491 479.
2P Congdon, “An Analysis of Population and Social Change in London Wards in the 1980s” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 14:4 (1989) 478-491, 487.
Jackson
"A European identity that is solely identified with the European Union, the Schengen Agreement, the free movement of peoples only within the internal market, or the tightening of external border controls, is an identity that deepens an ‘Us’/‘Other’ dichotomy"1
"Europe’s historical and recent experience of nationalisms should be sufficient warning against the dangers of defining ourselves in opposition to who we are not."2(10)
suggests that essentialist definitions of national identity tend to be mythological--"These essentialist understandings of Europe fail to take into account our own shared history of ‘barbarism’, restriction of civil liberties, or of an earlier version of Europe founded in Greek’s classical version of democracy (which incidentally excluded women and slaves)" 3(10)
points to the inconsistency of the term "migrant" 4(10-11)
"It is currently estimated that 1.5 million migrants arrive and settle in the EU each yeaR The same estimates also suggest that seven million migrants within the EU have irregular status with a further half a million of these arriving each yeaR In total, 4% of the EU population, or 18.5 million people, is made up of non-EU citizens"5 (11)
o
"Philip Putnam recently wrote that, “In the short to medium run… immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital.” [2] Yet he goes on to describe the social capital that develops in communities where social and cultural diversities have stimulated mutual enrichment and more encompassing identities. "6 (11)
o
"Franco Frattini takes the view that, "There can be no immigration without integration"7 (11)
o
"MR Frattini is sufficiently pragmatic to understand that Europe’s workplaces and pension funds will increasingly rely on economically productive young people from the new EU member states as well as those from Africa and Asia."8 (11)
o
"Net migration to the UK hit 400,000 in 2005 - almost double the level in 2004" 9(11)
o
"I simply want to stress here that the discourse of integration fails to address the question of the lack of internal integration." 10(12)
o
Reflects on the reasons that Christian migrants come to Europe and then alerts:
"However, the indigenous churches of Europe should take careful note of research conducted by Vitoria University in Spain during March 2005. The results were based on more than 500 interviews with immigrants from over 30 different countries. 85% said they believed in God, but this was a decrease from 99% for those who said that they had believed in God when they first arrived in Spain. Of those interviewed, some 15% had abandoned belief in God and a further 10% were in the process of losing it. Only a small percentage, 5.8%, reported experiencing their faith grow."11 (12)
o
"What emerges quite clearly, is that more regular church attendance tends to correlate with more positive attitudes towards migrant peoples." 12(12)
1 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
2 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
3 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10 [available Redcliffe site]
4 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 10–11 [available Redcliffe site]
5 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
6 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
7 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
8 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
9 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 11 [available Redcliffe site]
10 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
11 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
12 Darrell Jackson , '‘Where do you come from?’ The impact of migration on European identity', Encounters 20 (October 2007), 10–14, 12 [available Redcliffe site]
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
