Note that research was done with 43 people in four monocultural areas of Britain.
Racism not only about physical but also about cultural differences.
“where social and environmental conditions were better, there was, as a general rule, less apparent hostility to minorities.”
“By far the most frequent context for referring to ethnic minorities is that of perceived competition for resources- typically housing, but also employment, benefits, territory and culture.”
Onus for integration being placed on immigrants.
Integration seen as synonymous with assimilation.
“Placing the bouindary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a different place...does not abolish the boundary. The people forming ‘them’ are still racialised.”
“broadly speaking, people who interact more frequently and on an equal footing outside the workplace exhibit less prejudice than those who do not.”
Claims (in an indirect reference to the MORI poll) that there are in-built biases of polls showing immigration as an issue of major concern. Claim that when people are not prompted immigration does not score so highly.
Significant fear that the quality of services on offer are so poor that they cannot be extended to new arrivals.
Language barrier as a key issue in integration.
Emphasise information gap, especially on housing and entitlement to benefits as a major issue in promoting tension.
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Attitudes of "British" Society. Show all posts
Showing posts with label MGTUK: Attitudes of "British" Society. Show all posts
Tuesday, 13 January 2009
Tuesday, 25 November 2008
Moxon
Claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
negative focus on Asian enclaves, especially those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.20
defends Ron Atkinsons use of “nigger” to refer to Desailly, and other expressions such as “Paki” and “Wog.” In part based upon the use of derogatory terms for whites by other ethnic groups.21
complains about anti-white racism, especially “mugging” which he presents as a black hate crime against whites.22
denies that there was any significant immigrant component to the British population prior to the post WWII period.23
denies any significant link between immigration and colonialism24 (argues that British wealth came from Industrial revolution not empire; but does not deal with impact of Empire on former colonies)
points to the lack of investigation in the case of student visas, suggests this is a form of coming in as an economic migrant.25
criticism of the impact of immigrants, on the NHS, especially those who come specifically for treatment.26
“poor whites at all levels strongly dislike immigration...there is another section of the population that consistently feels most antagonized of all... 'Middle Englanders' who are neither poor nor well-off”27
hostility of ME-s to immigrants who have no cultural background in the country yet benefit from the welfare system.28
“Mori found that satisfaction with local government had a very strong inverse relation to the proportion of ethnic minorities in an area.”29
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
20S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 97–113.
21S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 114–128.
22S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 128–132.
23S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135.
24S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135–137.
25S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 140–145.
26S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 175–187.
27S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 199.
28S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 200–201.
29S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 202.
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
negative focus on Asian enclaves, especially those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin.20
defends Ron Atkinsons use of “nigger” to refer to Desailly, and other expressions such as “Paki” and “Wog.” In part based upon the use of derogatory terms for whites by other ethnic groups.21
complains about anti-white racism, especially “mugging” which he presents as a black hate crime against whites.22
denies that there was any significant immigrant component to the British population prior to the post WWII period.23
denies any significant link between immigration and colonialism24 (argues that British wealth came from Industrial revolution not empire; but does not deal with impact of Empire on former colonies)
points to the lack of investigation in the case of student visas, suggests this is a form of coming in as an economic migrant.25
criticism of the impact of immigrants, on the NHS, especially those who come specifically for treatment.26
“poor whites at all levels strongly dislike immigration...there is another section of the population that consistently feels most antagonized of all... 'Middle Englanders' who are neither poor nor well-off”27
hostility of ME-s to immigrants who have no cultural background in the country yet benefit from the welfare system.28
“Mori found that satisfaction with local government had a very strong inverse relation to the proportion of ethnic minorities in an area.”29
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
20S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 97–113.
21S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 114–128.
22S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 128–132.
23S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135.
24S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 135–137.
25S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 140–145.
26S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 175–187.
27S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 199.
28S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 200–201.
29S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 202.
migration watch
“he years 1991 – 2006 there was a net movement of some 2.3 million people to the UK - only 8% of which came from the new East European members of the EU”1
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
(SEE PRINTED GRAPH)
Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf
claims that immigration is now 15 times the scale of asylum and that 76% of the population favour caps on immigration.2 states that this is an “unprecedented scale” and that the net migration for 2005 was “292,000”.3
claims that 50,000 illegal immigrants are detected every year but no one knows how many will come in.4 claims to England being twice as crowded as Germany and four times as crowded as Paris.5 points to a 33% increase in the demand for visas, reaching 2.5 million a year.6
Against claims that immigrants bring economic growth affirms (1) that the benefit they bring is basically proportional to the increase in population they provoke. (2) They will not solve the pensions problem, as they themselves will become old (3) drive wages down and encourage British citizens to remain on benefits.7
Problems: (1) resentment amongst native population, shared by majority in ethnic minorities (2) fear that Britain is losing its distinct culture (3) formation of parallel communities with little loyalty to Britain, often at odds with one another, influenced by overseas satellite television (4) Pressure on housing and services (5) changing in the configuration of cities, especially London, claims that in the last decade 600,000 Londoners have left to be replaced by 700,000 immigrants (6) problem of immigration.8
Defends (1) limit on immigration so that those coming in balance those leaving (2) “explicit nation building” to integrate minorities. 9
Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008]
claims that until the 1950s there had been no major immigration into the UK, except from Ireland.10
1996 settlement figure 61,000 2005 figure 179,000.11
claims that the work permit system has become a major avenue for immigration.12
on illegal immigration 2001 Government estimate of between 310,000-570,000 centred on 430,000 with MWUK updating this to 515,000-870,000 centred on 670,000 estimating for asylum seekers whose claims have been rejected.13
“Net migration reached a record high of 222,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 185,000 in 2005. During the 60’s and 70’s emigration generally exceeded immigration and in the 80’s and early 90’s net immigration was generally below 50,000 people a year. Such very high migration into Britain is therefore a new phenomenon. Net non-EU migration to the UK has been rapidly increasing from 44,000 in 1992. In 2004 it reached a new record high level of 268,000. In 2005 it fell to 203,000 reflecting the fact that ten new countries had acceded to the EU in May 2004. There has been a steady net outflow of British citizens during this period - reaching a record high of 120,000 in 2004 before falling slightly to 107,000 in 2005. Net flows of EU citizens into the UK have been modest until recently. The maximum net inflow of citizens of the 15 continental European countries which were EU members before May 2004, in the period 1995 –2004, was 24,000 in 1998 and the maximum net outflow was 35,000 in 2002. This changed with the accession of the 10 countries to the EU in May 2004. The international migration statistics show that a net 49,000 and 65,000 people migrated from the accession countries in 2004 and 2005 respectively bringing total net migration from the EU up to 74,000 and 89,000 in these years. However, net migration from the accession countries only accounts for about 1 in 5 of net foreign immigration in total.”14
claims that the argument that immigrants do the jobs Brits do not want results in the creation of an underclass.15
denies, compared to other countries in Europe, that Britain has a demographic problem.16
“Over half of migrants live in London and the South East and more than 75% of new
migrants are settling there.”17
29% of the population of London consists of ethnic minorities.18
Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008)
Deny that the influx of immigrants is due to globalization but attribute it to government policies.19
1Migrationwatch UK, “2.3 million immigrants come to UK in 16 years” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pressreleases/pressreleases.asp?dt=02-June-2008 [Accessed 3 October 2008]
2Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
3Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
4Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
5Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 1.
6Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
7Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
8Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 2.
9Migrationwatch UK, “Outline of the Problem”MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/0utline_of_the_Problem_010107.pdf, 3.
10Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
11Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
12Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 1.
13Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
14Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 3.
15Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
16Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
17Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 4.
18Migrationwatch UK, “An Overview of UK Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Overview.pdf [Accessed 3 October 2008] 5.
Migration Watch UK
“Balanced Migration... is based on a simple principle: that the number of immigrants who are given permission to settle permanently in this country should be kept to approximately the same level as the number of British citizens who are emigrating. We are not seeking to reduce the number of people who come to work here for a few years and return home.”20
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
“until 1982 there was a net outflow of migrants from Britain. Between 1982 and 1997 average net immigration was about 50,000 a year. It has climbed rapidly since 1997 to reach a peak of 244,000 in 2004. This has now fallen to about 190,000 a year.”21
“Net foreign immigration is officially defined as the number of foreigners arriving in the UK intending to stay for more than a year, minus the number who leave intending to be away for more than a year. In 2006 arrivals reached 510,000 (about one per minute) and 194,000 left; so the net figure was 316,000. This amounts to 0.5% of our population every year, and is 25 times higher than any previous wave of immigration”22
“The following are the main government policies which have contributed to this massive increase in immigration:
• Removal of embarkation controls for EU destinations in 1994 and for the rest of the world in 1998.
• Allowing marriage to be used as a means of immigration from 1997.
• Doubling the number of work permits issued in 2002.2
• Opening the labour market to new EU members without restriction in 2004.
• Opening new immigration routes to the UK through the highly-skilled migrants programme and the graduate work scheme.”23
2006 68% of immigration came from countries outside the EU24
3 sources of illegal immigration (1) failed asylum seekers (2) illegal entry (3) overstayers25
Arguments against amnesty for illegal immigrants (1) would be an incentive (2) expensive to administer (3) would allow them to bring in family (4) unfair to reward illegal behaviour with access to welfare state.26
regarding education, problems of schools with many students who do not have English as a first language.27
NHS: problems (1) immigration outstrips growth of NHS (2) costs with maternity, interpretation and translation (3) tendency to go to A&E where questions about entitlement are not usually asked (4) importing of diseases such as TB and Hepatitis B28
Recognises that immigrants have contributed extensively to the NHS (1/3 of doctors and nurses) but claims that this is no longer necessary, especially with the increase of domesticall trained staff.29
strain upon police, especially through the criminality of immigrants, costs with translation and the issue of traffiking.30
claims that migrants cause problems for community cohesion, and that these concerns are shared by Black and Asian minorities in the UK (quotes statistics to this effect).31
refers to research by a House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs which denied that net immigration resulted in economic benefit for the United Kingdom.32 (1) per capita impact of immigration is small, with the cost of population increase33 (2) reduces the training and apprenticeship amongst native population34 (3) increasing retirement age is the only solution for the pension time-bomb, immigration has little impact.35
points to support from business leaders for controls on migration (but are questions to wishy-washy?)36
claim that immigrants and their descendants will account for 70% of the increase in British population growth.37
claims that by 2009 England will become more crowded than Holland, losing only to Malta.38
points to research that c.40% of the demand for new housing will come from immigration.39
20F Fields & N Soames “Preface” in Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 2–3, 3.
21Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 6.
22Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 7.
23Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 9.
24Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 10.
25Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 15.
26Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 16
27Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 17.
28Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
29Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 18.
30Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 19.
31Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 21.
32Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 23.
33Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
34Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 24.
35Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 25.
36Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 27.
37Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 28.
38Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 30.
39Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 31–32.
Migration Watch
First source of data is the Office of National Statistics International Migration Estimates. This is based on the International Passenger Survey which is a small voluntary sample of migration. Main weaknesses, (1) does not include land entry and smaller airports (2) does not include asylum seekers (3) is based on the declared intention of passengers which is not a clear guide. ONS seeks to correct some of these limitations. 2005 Estimate, net international migration of 185,000.79
Second source is the Settlement Data enumerating those granted indefinite leave to remain.80 Third source of data is the census.81
international migration to places where there are already existing ethnic minorities.82 London preferred area with 750,000 coming between 1993-2002.83 Balanced by the departure of white residents, especially young couples with children; increase in commuting.84 Higher the presence of ethnic minorities, higher the departure of white population.85 Brent white population declined from 136,600 in 1991 to 122,400 in 2001.86 Claims that this process leads to the separation of the white population from the ethnic minorities, and makes the integration of immigrants more difficult.87
2003 18.6% of births to mothers not from UK compared to 12.1% in 1993.88 (reached near 20% in 2004)89Outer London 41%; Brent 65% Greater London 47%90 2004: Births to foreign-born mothers are concentrated in particular areas. In Greater London as a whole the percentage is 49% (Inner London 57%, Outer London 43%) and the following London boroughs have 60% or more of births to foreign-born mothers:
Brent 68%
Camden 61%
Haringey 60%
Kensington and Chelsea 67%
Newham 71%
Tower Hamlets 69%91
MWUK claim that their stance is that immigration policy should reflect UK needs contra IPPR “apparent stance” that social policy should adapt to immigration trends.92
proposes tighter rules to discourage intercontinental marriage.93
“It is relevant to the UK that those granted amnesty in the EU will eventually obtain
documents that will permit them to travel to Britain. In Spain, anyone who has held a
resident permit for ten years can apply for Spanish nationality; for nationals of Latin
American countries and the Philippines, the qualifying period is only two years.”94
“It was also claimed that £4.7 billion would be “saved” by not undertaking their
forced removal. Nobody is suggesting such a course. One might just as well suggest
that we can “save” £100 billion by not sending a man to the moon!”95
Rather than removal suggest (1) stricter control on entry (2) stricter control on labour market (3) use of ID cards to deter from use of NHS and granting children access to school. (does not deal with human rights issue...nor the costs of these stricter controls.)96
79Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1–3.
80Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
81Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
82Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
83Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
84Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
85Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
86Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
87Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 7.
88Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
89Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
90Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
91Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
92Migrationwatch UK, “IPPR Report- Beyond Black and White” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_18_IPPR_report.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
93Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
94Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
95Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
96Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 6.
Second source is the Settlement Data enumerating those granted indefinite leave to remain.80 Third source of data is the census.81
international migration to places where there are already existing ethnic minorities.82 London preferred area with 750,000 coming between 1993-2002.83 Balanced by the departure of white residents, especially young couples with children; increase in commuting.84 Higher the presence of ethnic minorities, higher the departure of white population.85 Brent white population declined from 136,600 in 1991 to 122,400 in 2001.86 Claims that this process leads to the separation of the white population from the ethnic minorities, and makes the integration of immigrants more difficult.87
2003 18.6% of births to mothers not from UK compared to 12.1% in 1993.88 (reached near 20% in 2004)89Outer London 41%; Brent 65% Greater London 47%90 2004: Births to foreign-born mothers are concentrated in particular areas. In Greater London as a whole the percentage is 49% (Inner London 57%, Outer London 43%) and the following London boroughs have 60% or more of births to foreign-born mothers:
Brent 68%
Camden 61%
Haringey 60%
Kensington and Chelsea 67%
Newham 71%
Tower Hamlets 69%91
MWUK claim that their stance is that immigration policy should reflect UK needs contra IPPR “apparent stance” that social policy should adapt to immigration trends.92
proposes tighter rules to discourage intercontinental marriage.93
“It is relevant to the UK that those granted amnesty in the EU will eventually obtain
documents that will permit them to travel to Britain. In Spain, anyone who has held a
resident permit for ten years can apply for Spanish nationality; for nationals of Latin
American countries and the Philippines, the qualifying period is only two years.”94
“It was also claimed that £4.7 billion would be “saved” by not undertaking their
forced removal. Nobody is suggesting such a course. One might just as well suggest
that we can “save” £100 billion by not sending a man to the moon!”95
Rather than removal suggest (1) stricter control on entry (2) stricter control on labour market (3) use of ID cards to deter from use of NHS and granting children access to school. (does not deal with human rights issue...nor the costs of these stricter controls.)96
79Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1–3.
80Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
81Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
82Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
83Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
84Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
85Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
86Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
87Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Regions” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_10_Internal_migration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 7.
88Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
89Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
90Migrationwatch UK, “The Social Impact of Immigration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_11_Social_Impact_of_Immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
91Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
92Migrationwatch UK, “IPPR Report- Beyond Black and White” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_18_IPPR_report.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
93Migrationwatch UK, “The Effect of Immigration on the Integration of Communities in Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_19_effect_of_immigration_on_integration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
94Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
95Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 5.
96Migrationwatch UK, “An Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants?” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Other/10_15_Amnestyforillegals.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 6.
Thursday, 23 October 2008
Rutter
Addition of 2 million people to the foreign-born population resident in the UK.1 contrary to previous migration, this involves people from countries without historical ties to the UK and less familiar with the language, culture and practices.2 Since 1997 emergence of many new ethnic communities.3
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Wednesday, 22 October 2008
King
“As the oppressed of the East...the impoverished in the South...so the political rhetoric takes on a military tone: 'fortress Europe' under siege from the invasion of an army of migrants.”1
ius soli--> birthplace governs citizenship ius sanguinis; blood ties govern.2
difficulty of imposing very strict controls and maintaining the freedom of movement upon which Common Market was based.3
1R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
2R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
3R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 3.
ius soli--> birthplace governs citizenship ius sanguinis; blood ties govern.2
difficulty of imposing very strict controls and maintaining the freedom of movement upon which Common Market was based.3
1R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
2R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
3R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 3.
Hayes
Migration is courageous, yet stories of migrants are often ignored to justify restrictive controls.1
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
Wednesday, 1 October 2008
Moxon
claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
Wednesday, 24 September 2008
Solomos
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Increase in concern over race and immigration in Britain, US and Europe in the last two decades. 1) “resurgence of racist social and political movements…partly because of the mobilisation of anti-immigrant sentiments.” Issue of new forms of migration, asylum seekers and refugees.1
Refers to “the shifting tides of public opinion on such issues as religious differences, refugee and asylum policy, immigration and more recently illegal immigrants.”2
In Britain refers to “racialisation” in “employment, housing, education and alw and order.”3
Refers to Miles’ claim of a contradiction between “on the one hand the need of the capitalist world economy for the mobility of human beings, and on the other, the drawing of territorial boundaries and the construction of citizenship as a legal category which sets boundaries for human mobility.”4
Goldberg: movement from racism to racisms.5
“In numerical terms Irish migration to Britain over the past two centuries has been far greater than immigration by other groups. Yet there has been little direct state intervention to regulate immigration and settlement, particularly compared with the state's response to Jewish and black migrations.”6 liassez faire approach did not mean lack of hostility towards Irish immigrants.7
“images of the racial or cultural inferiority of the Irish were based not only on particular ideological constructions of the Irish but also on the definition of Englishness or Anglo-Saxon culture in terms of particular racial and cultural attributes. In later years such images of uniqueness and purity of Englishness were to prove equally important in political debates on black migration and settlement.”8
outlines the negative response to Jewish migration in the late 19th and early 20th century. Exemplified in the Alien Order Act which established the concept of “alien” and the tool of “deportation”. 9 re: threat of fascism “there was political reluctance to act decisevely to help Jewish refugees because of widespread anti-Semitism in British society.”10
Harris “a central theme of the debates on black communities during the interwar period was the supposed social problems to which their presence gave rise”11
“early immigration legislation was concerned with the entry into Britain of people who by law were aliens, that is, non-British citizens.”12
“the two most common responses to black immigration and settlement in this period [interwar] were political debates on the need to control their arrival and calls for the repatriation of those who had already settled in Britain.”13
“immigration and race were contested issues long before the arrival of large numbers of black colonial immigrants from 1945.”14
1 J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 3.
2 J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 4.
3 J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 7.
4 J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 27
5 J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 30.
6J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 38.
7J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 39.
8J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 39.
9J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 40–44.
10J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 44.
11J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 44.
12J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 45.
13J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 47.
14J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 48.
Solomos
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refers to the difference between direct discrimination and indirect discrimination.1
“from the very earliest stages of the migration process a number of local authorities, pressure groups and individuals raised the question of the impact of immigration on their localities.”2
at a local level issues such as “housing, employment and social problems” are linked in popular perception to immigration.3
“[Powell's] emphasis on the social and cultural changes brought about by immigration helped to create or recreate an understanding of Englishness or Britishness that was based on the notion of shared history, customs and kinship, which effectively excluded black and ethnic minorities from membership”4 “From this perspective the loss of Britain's national identity was due to the failure of the nation to recognise the repercussions of immigration on the national culture.”5
New Right move from “nativism and anti-immigration “ to seeing “the very presence of black and ethnic minority communities...as a threat to the way of life and culture of white citizens.”6 minorities presented as an “enemy within”7
“In practice the most resonant themes in racial discourses were not absolute notions of racial superiority, but the threats that black and minority communities presented to the cultural, political and religious homogeneity of white British society.”8
Thatcher's concern for preserving the “British nation” and “British character” linked to Conservatives taking votes from the National Front.9
points to the way negative social and cultural attributes are linked with terms such as “refugees” and “economic migrants”10
points to the development of anti-antiracist attitudes amongst the right.11
difficulty in developing “the acid test for who is and who is not English or British?”12
uncertainty over the meaning of Englishness or Britishness due to the changes national identity has been subjected to.13
British dilemma “of what kind of multicultural society it should become.”14
Tory dilemma of being part of Europe without losing British identity.15
“One of the trends that became clear during the 1980s and 1990s was the attempt to reinvent a British national identity in line with its historical image as an 'island race'”16 points to the role of the Rushdie affair in shaping this debate.17
“is clear that the debate on immigration was as much about perceived dangers to British national identity as it was about the potential number of immigrants.18
entaglement of the labour party in the debate on British/English identity.19
New Labour's attempt to balance expressions of patriotism with an embrace of mutliculturalism. After race riots in 2001 and 9/11 “there was a noticeable shift in political language on immigration and race relations.”20 refers to Blunkett's suggestion of a “British test”.21 increasing unease at the boundaries of multiculturalism.22
“rather than questioning and challenging the moral panic that has broken out over the question of refugees and asylum seekers New Labour has...added to it.”23
Emphasis on “social cohesion” and “integration”24
“Labour's time in power may come to be seen as a tragic missed opportunity to “think the unthinkable” and “do the undoable”.25
1J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 84.
2J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 95.
3J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 96.
4J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 172.
5J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 173.
6J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 174.
7J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 174.
8J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 174.
9J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 177.
10J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 184.
11J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 187–189.
12J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 210.
13J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 211.
14J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 211.
15J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 211–212.
16J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 212.
17J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 211–215.
18J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 218.
19J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 219.
20J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 220.
21J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 220.
22J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 220.
23J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 253.
24J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 254.
25J Solomos, Race and Racism in Britain, Third Edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2003, 254,
Spencer
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S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95.
Quotes Roy Hattersley “Without integration, limitation is inexcusable; without limitation, integration is impossible.”1
“The bi-partisan consensus that firm immigration control is the prerequisite of good race relations rests on the assumption that the hostility which some white people feel towards black and Asian people would be exacerbated if they believed that their entry into the country was not effectively controlled.”2
points to the way in which successive governments have failed to convince public opinion that immigration is under control, and the generally negative, and exaggerated, opinions regarding immigration in the general public.3
“Although it has become less socially acceptable to express negative views about black and Asian people within the United Kingdom, fewer inhibitions constrain expressions of such views about immigrants, foreigners, and, in recent years, refugees.”4
points to scholars (Jim Rose & Shamit Saggar) who suggest that politicians were responsible for fostering anti-immigration feeling with their emphasis on legislation.5
(writing in 1998) “Public fears that immigration is out of control are thus not justified. It has become increasingly difficult to enter the United Kingdom and numbers have fallen significantly over the last twenty years”.6
“the message sent to the public by immigration policy, that particular kinds of foreigners would not be welcome members of British society is in direct contradiction to the message relayed by government race relations policy- that existing members of minority communities in Britain should be accepted as equal members of society.”7 Quotes Roy Hattersley “if we cannot afford to let them in, those of them who are here already must be doing harm.”8
points to the way in which Immigration controls were targeted against Black and Asian immigrants.9 “In order to protect that legislation from challenge under the race discrimination legislation, immigrant law and its enforcement were and remain exempt from its provisions.”10
“It has been in the presentation of immigration policy that politicians have reinforced so forcefully the message that particular kinds of foreigners are unwelcome in the United Kingdom.”11
points to the fact that after Thatcher's claim in 1978 that British people were afraid of being swamped by people from alien cultures a poll indicated that the number of people who considered immigration an urgent issue rose from 9% to 21%.12
“Once government decides to appease rather than assuage public concern, new measures have to be proposed to show that something is being done. Loopholes are identified, rule changes proposed, appeal rights abolished, time-limits shortened, defences removed.”13
“Post-war immigration to Britain has, it appears, contributed to a national identity crisis. Having lost its imperial, military, economic and sporting prowess, Britain is no longer confident of its role and cultural identity.” results in fear of the arrival of those with different customs.14 “There has been a clear resistance to updating Britain's self-image to accommodate the multicultural reality of British society and its history.”15
Against an open door policy points to 1) reality of strong fears of immigration 2) “Immigrants who settle in the United Kingdom must be entitled to the same civil, political, social and economic rights and benefits as other residents. To suggest otherwise would be to concede a future two-tier society of those who really belong and those who do not. Employment is not available to all who need it and social and economic rights...are expensive.”16
points to the Canadian declaration which is defined mainly in terms of positive goals and contrasts it with the “defensive, largely negative, tone of the United Kingdom's aims”17
“Let us reject, once and for all, the message of tolerance. Tolerance is what we feel for those whom we disapporve of, or dislike, but nevertheless feel obliged to be civil to.”18
1S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 74.
2S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 74.
3S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 75.
4S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 75.
5S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 75.
6S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 77.
7S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 77.
8S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 77.
9S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 77–80.
10S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 78.
11S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 80.
12S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 80.
13S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 80.
14S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 83.
15S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 83.
16S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 84.
17S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 85.
18S Spencer, “The Impact of Immigration Policy on Race Relations” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 74–95, 90.
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
Escobar
S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28
Suggests that attitude of the population gets shaped by the accumulation of small daily episodes involving immigrants.1
Threefold challenge of migration (i) exercise compassion and sensitivity (ii) prophetic stance against the injustices suffered by immigrants (iii) as an avenue for mission.2
“missionary Christianity has flourished in the context of migration” both due to the uprootedness of the migrants, and the new freedom they acquire.3
Quotes Spanish Bishops Commission for Migration “"We would be betraying the most sacred dimension of people if all we want is cheap labor, forgetting that those who come to work with us are persons with all their rights. Because of that, the way is always to welcome the stranger" Use of Exodus texts on care for aliens 4
USA growth amongst those denominations who have adapted to receiving migrants.5
1S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28, 18.
2S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28, 18.
3S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28, 18.
4S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28, 21.
5S Escobar, “Migration: Avenue and Challenge to Mission” Missiology 31:1 (2003), 17–28, 25.
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