Tuesday, 25 November 2008
Migration Watch
main issue is whether contributing to society as a worker for 3-4 years should automatically have a path leading to settlement.61
economic migration (note admittance that most do not migrate for work purposes) may benefit employers, but costly for taxpayers and sectors of the indigenous population.62
contra claims of contribution in taxes claims (1) year used 1999/2000 atypical in terms of overall government surplus (2) ignores costs of immigrants (3) unfair in that it compares young immigrants to an, in average, older indigenous population.63
remittances have a negative effect on foreign exchange.64
claims of immigrant contribution have underestimated their impact on population growth, especially children born in the UK.65 in another paper this is amended, Government treats UK born children of mixed marriages as UK children, MWUK would rather they were treated as half/half.66 Still maintain there is no net benefit when compared to existing population.67
Quotes M Wolffe “The desirability of sizeable immigration is a matter more of values than of economics. It is not a choice between wealth and poverty, but of the sort of country one desires to inhabit.”68
note fear of a “Back door” route into the UK, especially through (1) amnesty to illegals in other countries (2) fast access to citizenship/settlement, would prefer 10 years of residence.69
points to London receiving 65% of immigrants.70
complains about the excessive extensions granted to student visas, which it sees as another “back door” into the UK.71
Statistics on Brazilian students (new visas/extensions) 2001: 10700/3395 ....2002: 9700/4635....2003: 8840/753072
claims that with zero net migration only 30% of the current projected homes built on greenfield sites would need to be built.73
Disputes claims by IPPR that granting an amnesty to illegal immigrants would bring in £1 billion a year to the treasury claiming that the cost would actually be of £0.8-1.8 billion a year. Main arguments: 1) IPPR calculations do not include the various public funds that immigrants would have access to 2) IPPR calculations underestimated the number of immigrants but overestimated the number in employment and how much they are earning.74 [note however that MWUK do not factor in the cost of deporting the illegal immigrants]
Outlines the UK Borders Act of 2007, significant for 1) the power of deportation at ports 2) biometric ID for immigrants 3) automatic deportation of foreign criminals.75
suggests that confusion may arise because of changes in terminology.76 Because Home Office is not always able to send Presenting Officers to Immigration Appeals, proposes that judges be allowed a more inquisitorial role.77
“The internationally accepted United Nations definition of a migrant is someone who changes his or
her country of usual residence for a period of at least a year”78
60Migrationwatch UK, Balanced Migration, (Deddington: Migrationwatch UK, 2008) 51–54.
61Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
62Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
63Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
64Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3.
65Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 3–4.
66Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
67Migrationwatch UK, “The fiscal contribution of migrants (revised)” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_10_Fiscal_contribution_of_migrants_190806.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
68Migrationwatch UK, “Migrants-Do they Bring Economic Benefit” MWUK Homepage available online at http://migrationwatch.co.uk/pdfs/economic/1_1_Migrants_Do_they_bring_economic_benefit.pdf, [Accessed October 7 2008] 9.
69A Green, “Evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union Sub-Committee F (Home Affairs) – INQUIRY INTO ECONOMIC MIGRATION TO THE EU” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_8_inquiry_into_economic_migration_to_the_eu.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
70Migrationwatch UK, “Submission to the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs on ‘The Economic Impact of Immigration’” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/economic/1_18_Submission_to_Hof.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
71Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 1.
72Migrationwatch UK, “Student 'Scams' provide yet another back door into Britain” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Education/2_2_student_visa_extension.pdf [Accessed October 8 2008] 2.
73Migrationwatch UK, “The impact of immigration on housing in England” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Housing/7_9_Impact_of_Immigration_on_housing.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
74Migrationwatch UK, “THE TRUE COST OF AN AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_19_True_cost_of_Amnesty.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008].
75H Mitchell, “UK Borders Act 2007” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/8_21_UK_Borders_Act_07.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008]
76H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 2.
77H Mitchell, “Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/Legal/BP8_28.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 4.
78Migrationwatch UK, “The Measurement of Migration” MWUK Homepage available online at http://www.migrationwatchuk.com/pdfs/MigrationTrends/9_1_Measuring_immigration.pdf [Accessed October 7 2008] 1.
Thursday, 23 October 2008
Rutter
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Wednesday, 22 October 2008
Hayes
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
Fielding
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.
Tuesday, 23 September 2008
Parekh
Society needs to balance the need of cohesion and a sense of belonging with the right of minority groups to preserve their way of life.1
Proceduralist view of integration: state as culturally neutral, minorities left free to choose up to which point they wish to assimilate the majority culture.2
Assimilationist model: need for a “common national culture” “the state has both a right and a duty to ensure that its cultural minorities assimilate or merge into the prevailing national culture.”3 cultural assimilation--> biological assimilation through intermarriage--> nationalist assimilation.4
Bifurcationist/liberal model of integration: focuses on public and private divide, unity in the public realm, diversity allowed in the private. Sharing of a “common political culture.”5
Pluralist model: need for a realisation of the multicultural nature of society, state has the role to promote the culture of ethnic minority groups.6
Millet model state has no independent status but is rather a “union of communities, a bare framework within which they should be free to pursue their traditional ways of life and engage in necessary social, political and economic interactions.”7 state should respect the individuality of the communities and work to preserve them.8
“The five models also entail different conceptions of citizenship. In the proceduralist model citizenship is purely formal in nature and consists of certain rights and obligations. In the assimilationist model it is grounded in the national culture and requires the citizen to share it as a necessary precondition of full membership of the political community. In the bifurcationist model the citizen is committed to sharing the political culture of the community. In the pluralist model citizenship has a plural cultural basis, and citizens bring their diverse cultures to the public realm and enjoy a culturally mediated membership of the political community. The millet model privileges communal membership and has no, or only a highly attenuated, notion of citizenship.”9
claims that the proceduralist model is logically incoherent, for any concept of a state must be based on certain (cultural) values, and thus it is impossible for the state to be culturally neutral.10
Assimilation (1) not clear what one is to assimilate into (2) rarely works in practice (3) impossible for liberal societies as it breaks the principle of equal respect for persons who are “culturally embedded and derive their sense of identity and meaning from their cultures.”11
Bifurcationist model (1) the “common” public values tend to represent the values of a certain, dominant group. (2) Discourse of public unity tends to outweigh discourse of private diversity12
Defends pluralist/multicultural model (1) “cherishes unity and diversity and privileges neither.”13public realm institutionalises and celebrates diversity.14
Critique of the millet model (1) freezes and isolates communities (2) ignores that individuals may belong to diverse communities.15
on post WW2 immigration “the consciousness of colour was imposed on the immigrants by white society for they did not define themselves in terms of it.”16 “Two interrelated factors were judged to stand in the way of good race relations, namely the number of immigrants and white society's discrimination against them...Successive governments therefore decided upon the interrelated and mutually legitimising policies of restricting black and Asian immigration and combating discrimination.”17
Issue of integration emerges in 1960s, beginning of discourse of multiculturalism. Note however, use of term “ethnic minorities” rather than “ethnic groups” as was the case in USA and Canada.18 Resistance of language by conservative commentators.19
conservatives preferred assimilationist model, liberals bifurcationist model.20 both shared the consensus that the public realm was to be shaped by the dominant, white, culture.21
Explores the impact of the Rushdie affair on the debate including (1) the shift of many integrationists to assimilation (2) the emergence of the pluralist perspective (3) realisation of the need for minorities to become actors in the debate (4) issue that Britain also had a cultural problem.22
1B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 1.
2B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 1–2.
3B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 2.
4B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 2.
5B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 2–3.
6B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 3.
7B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 4.
8B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 4.
9B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 5,
10B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 5–7.
11B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 7–8.
12B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 8–9.
13B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 9.
14B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 10.
15B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 11–12.
16B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 13–14.
17B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 14.
18B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 14–15.
19B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 15.
20B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 15..
21B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 17.
22B Parekh, “Integrating Minorities” in T Blackstone, B Parekh and P Sanders, Race Relations in Britain: a developing agenda, (London: Routledge, 1999) 1–21, 18–20.
CCME
“A report published in 2004 by the UK House of Commons2 clearly shows that the costs of migration are outweighed by the economic benefit migration brings. Therefore the Commission’s initiative is a good starting point for a shift of paradigm in the political debate. Migration should no longer be regarded as an indication of crisis and deficit but as a chance and resource for the countries of origin as well as for the hosting societies.”1
“people migrating for reasons of labour, usually as a main priority, seek thereby to improve their own life and the lives of their families ... come with individual hopes, challenges and skills, interests, and inalienable human rights...Migration can be a source of income and the unofficial social security system for the families of migrants. Moreover, migration contributes to increased knowledge and in some cases improves the economic standing of a country. In other cases it might completely deprive the country of its most needed skilled or highly skilled labour.”2
Links migration to the unequal impact of globalization.3
“The point to be taken from this is that migration in the modern world, in both its forced and ‘voluntary’ versions, has to be understood as arising for many people as an act of necessary adaptation to developments beyond their individual control. In many instances, people migrate in order to ensure their basic survival; in others, because the task of living with a degree of dignity and the hope for a marginally better future requires movement to another country.”4
points to the fact that actions designed to combat terrorism affect the issue of remittances.5
“approaches the issue of migration as one of “service providers”. This logic in our view raises strong concerns about a perspective, which exclusively sees migrants as a workforce, but hardly as human beings with hopes, plans, dreams and, foremost: rights.”6
points to the disaster of the guest worker system in the 1970s and claims that immigration policy needs to take into consideration that whether people stay or return often has little link to their initial intentions.7
1Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
2Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
3Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 2.
4Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 3.
5Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 4.
6Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 6.
7Churches’ Commission for Migrants in Europe “Comments on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations” COM (2005) 390 final Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage available online at www.ccme.be [Accessed September 10 2008] 7.
CCME
“As Christian organisations, we are deeply committed to the dignity of the human individual, the concept of global solidarity and the promotion of a society that welcomes strangers”1
need for both migrants and receiving society to be active in promoting integration.2
Key principles (1) equal rights for all legally residing citizens (ambiguous here as they include third country nationals) (2) right to family reunification (3) “Regularisation schemes for irregular migrants should be seen as a means of improving both the individual situation of the irregular migrant and at the same time improving the level of integration in our societies. EU legislation should not criminalise migrants in irregular situations.”3
refer to the need to employ migrants in sectors other than “typical migrant ones”4
“All migrants, including undocumented, should have access to basic services such as health care and education, and assisting undocumented migrants for humanitarian reasons must not be criminalised.”5
1Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, “Joint comments on the Commission Communication presenting A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM (2005) 389 final” Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage, available online at www.ccme.be/archive/2006/comments%20integration%20communication.pdf [Accessed September 10 2008], 1
2Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, “Joint comments on the Commission Communication presenting A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM (2005) 389 final” Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage, available online at www.ccme.be/archive/2006/comments%20integration%20communication.pdf [Accessed September 10 2008], 2.
3Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, “Joint comments on the Commission Communication presenting A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM (2005) 389 final” Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage, available online at www.ccme.be/archive/2006/comments%20integration%20communication.pdf [Accessed September 10 2008], 3.
4Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, “Joint comments on the Commission Communication presenting A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM (2005) 389 final” Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage, available online at www.ccme.be/archive/2006/comments%20integration%20communication.pdf [Accessed September 10 2008], 4.
5Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe, “Joint comments on the Commission Communication presenting A Common Agenda for Integration Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union, COM (2005) 389 final” Churches Commission for Migrants in Europe Homepage, available online at www.ccme.be/archive/2006/comments%20integration%20communication.pdf [Accessed September 10 2008], 4.
Reis
RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163.
Compares the situation of many immigrants to that of a boat unable to arrive at a port.1
Sovereignty of the state linked to its monopoly over the legitimacy of mobility.2
International migration is therefore a political movement, from the sphere of influence of one state to that of another.3
Outlines development of international law and declarations on immigration.4
points to a worrying tendency of the criminalization of illegal immigration. Matter of concern for the Brazilian government as many Brazilian immigrants (Itamaraty estimates 1/3) are undocumented. Fears for the abuse of their human rights.5 Refers to negotiations between the Brazilian government and the Portuguese government, and in the USA over the “Operacao Desembarque” concerning the dignified deportation of Brazilians held as illegal immigrants in America.6
tendency in international law to recognise individuals as having rights independent of their nationality.7
Nationality determined by political contract (“French” Model) vs determined by (dominant) Culture (“German” Model)8
Migration seen to intensify issue of national identity: 3 questions raised for the state 1) who can come in 2) of those who can come in who can stay permanently 3) of those who can stay permanently how many can become citizens.9
Presents the position that the ability and right of the state to determine citizenship and control its borders is being weakened by 1) International law and the universalisation of human rights 2) economic changes 3) the difficulties in controlling illegal immigration. Counter to this argues 1) although the rights of migrants are protected, the right to immigration is not 2) immigration increasingly being linked to national security. Claims the issue is rather the difficulty in determining what the state is, what it's role is, and how national identity is to be determined.10
1RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 149.
2RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 150.
3RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 150.
4RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 151–153.
5RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 153.
6RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 153.
7RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 153.
8RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 155.
9RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 155–156.
10RR Reis, “Soberania, Direitos Humanos e Migrações Internacionais” Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais 19:55 (2004), 149–163, 156–161.
Castaneres
A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65.
Points out that migration (3%) currently represents a lower proportion of the world population than during other periods.1 in terms of economically active population even less (1.4-1.6%).2
focus on migration occurs because migrants are more visible than the other, often negative, effects of globalization.3
points to the paradox of at the same time freeing the flow of capital and goods, whilst applying restrictions to the flow of labour.4
migration seen as a response to the inequalities of international capitalism, especially between states.5
workers without documentation in US less likely to make trips/ Return to home country.6
claims that human rights of workers are weakened by a theory of citizenship which ties rights to a legal status.7
1A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 43.
2A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 44.
3A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 44.
4A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 44.
5A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 46.
6A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 57–58.
7A Castañer & T Dunn, “Trabajadores Indocumentados Y Nuevos Destinos Migratorios en La Globalizacion” Política y Cultura 23 (2005) 43–65, 62.
Monday, 22 September 2008
Conn and Ortiz
o "In the English speaking world the inner-city core is increasingly reserved for the poor and the non Anglo-Saxon immigrants. In non-English speaking Europe, by comparison, people of different income groups live intermingled in the city while preserving class distinctions within and among buildings."1 (69)
"the city becomes the land of those who are left behind- the poor, the underemployed, the ethnic outsider. The conditions they inherit are economic decline, physical decay and social disintegration.2" (70)
fortress Europe and foreigners being considered second class citizens3 (71)
"the deep-rootedness of England's class system is in conflict with this multiethnic presence."4 (72)
"the Western European welcome to the guest worker is vanishing in the face of automation and the transfer of specialized industries to other parts of the world"5 (208-209)
links to racism against immigrants 6(209)
international travel has increased migration, greater feminization of migrants 7(212)
o impact of migration: (i) unsettled (ii) loss of family support system (iii) open to novelty8 (319-320)
ethnic identity linked to encountering otherness9 (321)
immigration process
(i) voluntary segregation followed either by assimilation or pluralism 10(321-323)
o
claims that applying the HUP in multi-ethnic cities actually ends up killing churches as "these churches literally die off because they are incapable of reaching out to the new citizens of the community, people who are from a different ethnic group and maybe even a different socioeconomic class."11 (331)
Ortiz models of integrating ethnic churches:
(1) renting model
(2) celebrative model--still separate but diversity celebrated
(3) integrative model--co-equal leadership, shared ownership of facilities, vision and ministry approach. 12(331-332)
o
Second generation ethnic churches: immigrant churches: torn between two languages. Principles
(1) maintain their identity
(2) know their own history
(3) church leaders need to understand them
(4) need for leadership
(5) language--sermons in English but other language used for other items13 (333)
o
spiritual warfare in cities---religious pluralism, polarization of ethnic groups 14(358-359)
1H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 69.
2H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 70.
3H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 71.
4H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 72.
5H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 208–209.
6H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001)209.
7H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 212.
8H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 319–320.
9H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 321.
10H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 321–323.
11H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 331.
12H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 331–332.
13H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001)333.
14H. Conn & M. Ortiz, Urban Ministry: The Kingdom, the City and the People of God, (Illinois: Downers Grove, 2001) 358–359.
Castles and Miller
1990s-- extreme-right mobilization and "supposed threats to national identity" brought these issues to the centre ofg the political stage.1 (9)
"immigration complicates existing conflicts or divisions in societies with long-standing ethnic minorities."2 (12)
tension and contradiction between seeking assimilation and allowing long-term cultural difference.3 (12-13)
"Immigration has often taken place at the same time as economic restructuring and major changes in political and social structures...people whose conditions of life are already changing in an unpredictable way often see the newcomers as the cause of insecurity. They fear that they are being 'swamped' by forces beyond their control...Migrations and minorities are seen as a danger to living standards, life styles and social cohesion..."4 (13
Racism as a threat not just to immigrants but also to democracy and social order.5 (13)
challenge of shaping social policies and structuring social services.6 (14)
nation state founded on the myth of cultural and political unity, threatened by the arrival of immigrants. resolution sought through rules governing citizenship and naturalisation.7 (14)
"migrants intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behaviour."8 (18)
sets the behaviour of the migrant beyond the individual dimension in the context of social changes in country of origin and country to which will migrate 9(18)
Ravenstein, push and pull theories, generally quite individualistic and ahistorical10 (19-20)
crititicised for being simplistic and unable to explain "actual movements or predicting future ones." 11(20-21)
do not explain
(1) why it is not the poorest who migrate, but those of an intermediate state.
(2) why migration is often towards densely populated areas not away from them.
(3) why migrants choose to go to some areas and not others. 12(21)
1S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993)9.
2S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 12.
3S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 12–13,
4S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 13.
5S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 13.
6S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 14.
7S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 14.
8S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 18.
9S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 18.
10S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 19–20.
11S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 20–21.
12S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 21.
Castles and Miller
"the migrant is also a gendered subject, embedded in a whole set of social relationships."1 (31)
"ethnic cultures play a central role in community formation."2 (33)
"retention of language and culture by ethnic minorities is taken as a proof of inability to come to terms with an advanced industrial society. Dominant groups tend to see migrant cultures as primordial, static and regressive."3 (33)
ethnic minorities--. culture as a source of identity and resistance towards discrimination4 (33)
"As multinational companies take over and repackage the artifacts of local cultures it becomes possible to consume all types of cultural products everywhere, but at the same time they lose their meaning as symbols of group identity. National or ethnic cultures shed their distinctiveness and become just another celebration of the cultural dominance of the international industrial apparatus." 5(34)
"Culture is becoming increasingly politicised in all countries of immigration. as ideas of racial superiority lose their ideological strength, exclusionary practices against minorities increasingly focus on issues of cultural difference."6 (35)
modern state authroity formally derived from the people therefore it is fundamental to define who belongs to the people7 (36)
"Citizenship is therefore the essential link between state and nation, and obtaining citizenship is of central importance for newcomers to a country." 8(36)
"nation is essentially a belief system, based on collective ties and sentiments. These convey a sense of identity an belonging, which may be referred to as national consciousness." 9(36)
"minorities appear most threatening when they appear to be occupying distinct areas."10 (37)
challenge of immigrants as they have relationships with more than one state11 (38)
ideal-types of citizenship: (i) the imperial model--being the subject of the same ruler (ii) folk or ethnic model (iii) republican model-- loyalty to a constitution and national cultural (iv) multicultural model, loyalty to a constitution 12(39)
1S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 31.
2S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 33.
3S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 33.
4S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 33.
5S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 34.
6S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 35.
7S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 36.
8S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 36.
9S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 36.
10S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 37.
11S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 38.
12S. Castles & M. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, (London: Macmillan, 1993) 39.