Wednesday, 22 October 2008

King

“As the oppressed of the East...the impoverished in the South...so the political rhetoric takes on a military tone: 'fortress Europe' under siege from the invasion of an army of migrants.”1

ius soli--> birthplace governs citizenship ius sanguinis; blood ties govern.2

difficulty of imposing very strict controls and maintaining the freedom of movement upon which Common Market was based.3


1R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.

2R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.

3R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 3.

Muir

Points to the challenge to the “relatively hands-off” approach Britain has traditionally taken in relation to identity and citizenship caused by the threat of terror and the impact of globalization.1

2006 Mori Poll 40% see immigration as a major issue.2

“Sociologists have found that while (contrary to much media speculation) segregation in the UK is not increasing, it does remain high for certain groups in certain parts of the country”3

claims that new identity politics has set itself as against multi-culturalism which is believed to have gone to far and to be responsible for segregation.4

involves a stress on local identity, seen as essential to promote community cohesion.5

social cohesion can be promoted through: (1) tackling discrimination 2) tackling social inequality; many tensions caused when those on low income have to compete for welfare 3) cultural change through shared action (to increase contact), shared values, essentially those of citizenship (through citizenship education/tests, etc...) and shared identities 6

Promoting shared identity seen to have the specific contribution of promoting emotional attachment and a sense of solidarity.7

“Promoting shared identities can be no substitute for the difficult task of reducing social and economic inequalities.”8

Process of promoting shared identity should not be seen as a substitute for multiculturalism, which is a way of respecting difference within common institutions.9

“Rather than focusing on the much contested concept of multiculturalism, those who worry about segregation might do better to focus on the wide array of structural factors that in some parts of the country have allowed parallel lives to develop. These include the housing market, school choice and the poverty and low levels of social mobility that are acute for many minority groups.”10

“It is much easier for new migrant communities to retain links with their homelands or fellow immigrants in other countries than was once the case. In this context the role of institutions such as the BBC or the mainstream press in helping to define our collective experience as a society is much weaker than it was in the past, when many more people watched the same programmes and read the same papers.”11

points to a celebration of democracy, multiculturalism, music, arts, sport and heritage as means of developing a more open sense of British identity.12

1R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.

2R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.

3R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.

4R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.

5R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 6.

6R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 7–8.

7R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 8–9.

8R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.

9R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.

10R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10

11R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 14.

12R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 15–16.

Lowell

“For those who oppose labour migration to the UK and Europe, the potential for brain drain has become a useful political stick with which to beat those who want to see access to the world’s most successful labour markets opened up to those who live outside them.”1


Prefer the term “brain strain” to “brain drain” as it emphasises the two-way nature of the process.2

See international migration as an integral part of globalization and economic development and that things can be managed to be beneficial for both countries involved.3

Claims that Brazil would benefit from a higher level of increased skill emigration, as this would help stimulate higher education study.4


basic theory is that Brain strain will slow down the economic development of developing countries unless the following are promoted (1) managed migration, promoting temporary and circular migration (2) policies to increase the influence of the diaspora on home country through the transfer of knowledge and skills, remittances and investment (3) promotion of democracy and institutions, especially educational, in the sending country.5

1H Crawley & D Sriskandarajah “Preface” in B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 3–4, 3.

2B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.

3B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.

4B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 11.

5B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 13.

Humphries

Claims that when the Tories where in power it was possible for pro-immigrant groups to access funding from Labour councils, but this has become almost impossible with the coming of New Labour to power.1

differentiates between external controls in defining those who may enter the UK and internal controls in the “policing of welfare”.2


“In defending what is 'ours' we deny the human situations of the 'other'.”3

“immigration rules, laws and practices are formed around the notion that Britain has a certain way of life.”4

1B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 38.

2B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 39.

3 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 77.

4 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 89.

Hayes

Migration is courageous, yet stories of migrants are often ignored to justify restrictive controls.1

“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2

“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3

claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4

critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5

emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6

“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.

1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8

“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9

care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10


1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.

2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.

3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.

4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.

5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.

6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.

7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.

8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.

9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.

10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.

Fielding

Points to neo-liberal (ie free market) arguments against migration policies and libertarian arguments which see it as a breach of human rights.1
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.

Farrant et al

“Public concern about immigration in general is at unprecedented levels (MORI 2005), with a significant proportion of people polled recently feeling that the Government does not have immigration under control (MORI 2003).
Irregular migration is seen as an important public issue in several ways:

• as evidence that the immigration system is failing or being abused

• as a challenge to national sovereignty (that is, the UK may not have total control over who comes and goes from the country)

• as potentially compromising the security of the UK (especially in light of growing fears about international terrorism)

• as exposing some vulnerable migrants to exploitation, in transit or when they get to the UK. “1


define irregular migrants as those “liable to be deported for issues related to immigration status.”2 reasons 1) entry by avoiding controls 2) false documents 3) overstay 4) unreturned asylum seekers 5) lack of papers 6) failure in applying for asylum elsewhere.3
preference for term irregular as it captures complexity of issue and avoids connotation with criminality; irregulars have committed administrative offences and not serious crimes.4
compares use of “Irregular” “Illegal” “Undocumented” and “Unauthorised.”5
points out that the reasons for irregular migration are basically the same as those for regular migration; “it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity”6;
preference for the residual method of determining # of irregular migrants (subtracting from the total number of foreign born residents those entitled to be here legally) range of 310,000-570,000 with a median estimate of 430,000. Limitations 1) does not include all those liable to deportation (e..g. Over-working students) 2) census data out of date.7
points to the many dangerous routes of entry into the UK.8
irregular migrants concentrated in those jobs which are “difficult, dirty and dangerous” (and low-paid)9
“There are several different estimates regarding the scale of the informal economy in the UK. One average ‘guesstimate’ of its size is 6.8 per cent of GDP or £75 billion (Small Business Council 2005). While there may be short‐term fiscal advantages for both the individual and the employer in the informal economy, the broader social and economic costs are significant, ranging from a loss of social protection and rights, to increased taxpayers’ burden and limited business expansion”10 nonetheless irregulars may ensure that some jobs are done; or do not have prices pushed up dramatically.11
regularisation would involve a contribution of £485 million to over £1 billion a year to the exchequer.12
cost of deportation averages at £ 11,000 a case.13
more restrictive controls in which migrants find it more difficult to travel to and from between home country and host country may encourage permanence.14
“Immigration to the UK has been less permanent than is commonly thought: almost half (46 per cent) of all overseas‐born immigrants left the UK within five years of arrival between 1981 and 2002 (Office for National Statistics 2004).”15
Difficulty in defending human rights of irregulars as 1) Britain has no written constitution 2) irregulars excluded from many international conventions 3) Bringing a case to court involves exposure and the risk of deportation.16
compares the effect of different policies towards irregular migration.17
UK Policy: 1) historically a reliance on external border control, including carrier liability 2) a trend towards the use of internal controls e.g. Ids 3) reduce the demand for irregular labour through employer sanctions (on the whole ineffective so far) 4) increase the scope for regular migration [but is current points system a form of reversing this for low skilled labour] 5) long residence concession (discretionary for adults with 14 consecutive years and children with seven) 18 No current plans for a major regularisation programme.19
1M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 4.
2M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
3M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
4M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
5M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 6.
6M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 8.
7M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 9.
8M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 10.
9M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 11.
10M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
11M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
12M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
13M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
14M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
15M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
16M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 14.
17M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 15.
18M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
19M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.