Does not include in his definition those who have a legal right to remain but have breached the condition (e.g. By working) unless their right to remain has been revoked.1
points to adaptation made to the North American residual method to apply to the UK.2 claims that emigration is more common in the first two years of arrival in the UK.3
“The unauthorised resident population in the UK in April 2001 has a central estimate of 430,000, and a
range (based on taking all the most extreme assumptions discussed in Annex 3) of 310,000 to
570,000. These 430,000 unauthorised immigrants living in the UK in 2001 constituted 0.7 per cent of
the total UK population of 59 million. This compares to seven million unauthorised migrants in January
2000 in the US,9 2.5 per cent of the total US population of just over 281 million, using the same
method. The comparison is especially positive for the UK when one considers that the US
unauthorised population has been reduced by amnesties.”4
1J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 1.
2J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 2–4.
3J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 4.
4J Woodbridge, Sizing the Unauthorised (Illegal) Migrant Population in the United Kingdom in 2001, Home Office Online Report 29/05 available online at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/rdsolr2905.pdf [Accessed October 15 2008] 5.
Thursday 23 October 2008
White
“The influxes of labour which started during the years of economic reconstruction, and which later developed into family movement, have created whole communities of ethnic minorities in most large European cities.”1
difficulties of enumeration include clandestine migration, the issue of definition, especially when migrants are citizens of the country they are going to.2
migration of indigineous population to the suburbs increases impact of migration on cities.3
housing circumstances reflects the status and culture of the migrants, and the attitude of those who are powerful in the housing sector.4
London issue of exploitation of immigrant residents in slum property by landlords, often of similar ethnic origin in the 1960s.5
points to the fact that segregation may be a defensive approach of the migrants themselves, or part of a housing strategy.6
refers to a tendency towards dispersal rather than segregation; but uncertain whether it will remain.7
1P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 65.
2P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
3P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
4P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 68.
5P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 70.
6P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 71–72.
7P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 73.
difficulties of enumeration include clandestine migration, the issue of definition, especially when migrants are citizens of the country they are going to.2
migration of indigineous population to the suburbs increases impact of migration on cities.3
housing circumstances reflects the status and culture of the migrants, and the attitude of those who are powerful in the housing sector.4
London issue of exploitation of immigrant residents in slum property by landlords, often of similar ethnic origin in the 1960s.5
points to the fact that segregation may be a defensive approach of the migrants themselves, or part of a housing strategy.6
refers to a tendency towards dispersal rather than segregation; but uncertain whether it will remain.7
1P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 65.
2P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
3P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 66.
4P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 68.
5P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 70.
6P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 71–72.
7P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 73.
Sris 2
Between 2000 and 2002 health service and IT were the main industries for which work permits were issued.1
difficulty in defining a “migrant” limitation in using the term “foreign-born” (which may include British citizens born overseas) and “foreign” (which may exclude migrants who take up citizenship).2
outline the existing paths, pre-point system, under which a migrant may come to the UK to work.3
migration, deal with labour and skills shortage, but on its own, not a sufficent measure to deal with ageing population.4
difficulty in defining a “migrant” limitation in using the term “foreign-born” (which may include British citizens born overseas) and “foreign” (which may exclude migrants who take up citizenship).2
outline the existing paths, pre-point system, under which a migrant may come to the UK to work.3
migration, deal with labour and skills shortage, but on its own, not a sufficent measure to deal with ageing population.4
Sris
Explain their use of the LFS (Labour force survey-a quarterly sampling of the Labour force) and some of its limitations.1
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Better control over the Eurotunnell and in Calais reduced number of those entering illegally.2
census data on foreign born population present in a table3 OECD estimate that 9.7% are foreign-born in 20054 LFS 10.1 in 2007, still lower than many other European countries.5
critiques the way public discourse confuses immigrants and settled black and ethnic minority communities.6
note that Brazil does not appear in the list of ethnic groups with other 60,000 in the UK.7
chance of re-emigration increases with time in the UK.8
suggest a higher tendency to be entrepreneurial amongst immigrants.9 linked to difficulties in the labour market.10
claims that evidence suggests that immigrants do not compete with native workers for jobs and that immigration actually contributes to increase the wages of the latter.11
indicate that on the whole, the take up of benefits amongst immigrant communities is less than in the native British population (proves this through a breakdown of benefits, including social housing). When it is higher, this is usually down to the incidence of naturalised British citizens and recognised refugees.12
most immigrant groups fare better economically than the British based population [note this does not include irregulars]; however, great differences between ethnic groups (note that many of the higher earners are people who were allowed in precisely to earn high wages as high skilled migrants.)13
Rutter
Addition of 2 million people to the foreign-born population resident in the UK.1 contrary to previous migration, this involves people from countries without historical ties to the UK and less familiar with the language, culture and practices.2 Since 1997 emergence of many new ethnic communities.3
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Claims that at a time when the government has sought to make taking up citizenship more meaningful, “supermobility” has meant that less migrants are eligible or interested in taking up citizenship, making the use of naturalisation as a a means to promote integration less effective.4
points out that whilst net migration has increased, the emigration of both British citizens and non-British residents has increased substantially since the 1990s.5 “migrationflowshavebecomemore
diverse,with more people arriving from a larger range of countries for a more diverse set of reasons”6 increased diversity in the foreign born population.7
table with the 35/36 highest foreign-born populations in UK; note that Brazil does not appear, as Singapore in 35 has a population in 2007 of 41,800 this raises questions about the 180,000 Brazilians in the UK claim.8
“about a third of all foreign-born people currently in the UK,oraround2millionpeople,have been in the UK for five years or less. Around half have been here for 10 years or less....While a fifth of immigrants in 1997 had arrived within the previous five-year period, this proportion had increased to a quarter in 2002 and stands currently a ta third. At the other end of
the spectrum,the proportion of immigrants who had been in the UK for20 years or more fell from around a half in 1997 to a third in 2007.”9 Increase in temporary and circular migration,10 Reasons (1) behaviour of Central and Eastern Europe migrants (2) Skilled migrants who come with work permits much less likely to choose settlement11 (3) International students, increase in numbers returning (except last two years (i) encouraged to work by government policy (ii) longer studies –one reason not explored is fear of not being able to return with tighter entry controls.)12 (4) asylum seekers situation often temporary (v) irregular migrants not granted settlement.13
refers to the challenge to cohesion and integration caused by the increased mobility of these migrants within the UK.14
refers to the emergence of a group of “denizens” who have access to some of the entitlements of citizenship, but not all.15
40% of migrants eligible to take up British citizenship choose not to do so.16 the lower the income in the country of origin, the more likely to take up citizenship.17 suggest that whilst naturalisation might increase, the number of migrants choosing to naturalise might also.18
reasons for taking up passport in survey 1) advantages (thus less for EU nationals) 2) facilitates emigration to USA/Canada 3) security from removal.19
Migrant perspective on integration facilitated by 1) secure immigration status 2) tolerance 3) employment 4) fluency in English 5) social networks 6) support from advisers/ professionals.20
Social interaction: although many have friends outside of their community process complicated by 1) language barriers 2) many here only for the short term 3) low income, multijobs, little leisure time 4) rejection by the British majority.21 migrants more religiously active than British population.22
highly educated and established involved in volunteering.23
Primary attachment to the UK emerges with length of residence, owning property and having children; many feel attached to the UK but not connected to their local community. For some home is both here and there.24
personal and idiosyncratic notions of Britishness often attached to freedom and security.25
note the attempt to move away from ethnic nationalism towards a civic nationalism, based on rights, values, institutions and language.26 Critics still claim that this resorts to “irrelevant mythologies and imagined communities.”27 and still end up with white people policing what it means to be British.28 It is in the context of insecurity about British identity, the spread of far right ideas amongst white working class and the fear of religious extremism, that the concern for citizenship ceremonies and tests has emerged.29
claim that progressive citizenship policy should seek to integrate short-term and circular migrants.30
critiques the high cost attached to naturalisation.31 need to make naturalisation a positive experience, rather than one done to avoid negative consequences.32 suggest extending the right for registered migrants to vote in local elections.33 need for a national strategy of volunteering.34 Both local councils and universities and colleges should have strategies for integration.35
1J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
2J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
3J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
4J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 5.
5J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
6J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
7J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
8J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
9J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
10J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 8.
11J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
12J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 9–10.
13J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10.
14J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 10–11.
15J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
16J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 13.
17J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
18J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
19J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 15–16.
20J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
21J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
22J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 17.
23J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
24J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
25J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 19.
26J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 21.
27J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
28J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
29J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 22.
30J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 23.
31J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008)24.
32J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
33J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
34J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 25.
35J Rutter, M Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Beyond Naturalisation: Citizenship Policy in an Age of Supermobility, A Research Report for the Lord Goldsmith Citizenship Review (London: IPPR, 2008) 26.
Pollard
Explores some of the future trends for migration flows between A8 countries and UK, [some might apply to Brazilian migration] 1) Development in sending country may lead to a reduction in push factors1 2) Diversion to alternative destinations -note that even without the issue of entry restrictions the demand of the British labour market has been higher than that of other EU countries.2 demographic changes leading to fall of potential migrants.3 4) Devaluing of pound sterling, reduction of pull factor.4
1N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 48.
2N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 49–50.
3N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 51.
4N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 51.
1N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 48.
2N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 49–50.
3N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 51.
4N Pollard, Ma Latorre & D Sriskandarajah, Floodgates or Turnstiles: Post-EU Enlargement Migration Flows to (and from) the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 51.
Nathan
Critiques the way that migration is often presented in terms of national benefits v local costs; argues that there is a lack of research on the long term impact of migration on local communities.1
uneven spread of migrants across Britain, concentration in large cities but increasing presence in rural areas.2
Key agencies (1) Home office (2) MAC- Migration Advisory Committee has the role of determining employer needs (3) MIF- Migration Impact Forum3
compared to other countries long term migration intake in the UK is low, yet short term migration flow is high, and becoming more significant than long term.4
migration leading to changes in both large and smaller urban areas with an increase in diversity.5
Three major effects of migration on local economies: 1) skills 2) diversity 3) size of population and of economy.6
employers like migrants: 1) “hard and soft skills” 2) “bring fresh ideas, approaches and experiences.”7
tendency for the “downgrading” of highly skilled migrants.8
In the long term migration expected to have little if no effect on wage and employment levels. In the short term impact may be reduced by migrants competing between themselves for jobs UK population do not want. Marginalisation of migrants may cause problems as this may encourage a “cheap labour” fix rather than an improvement in technology and in the skills of the existing workforce.9
Diversity 1) widens skill set 2) innovation 3) emergence of new markets, both in the country and overseas.10
migrants have a “housing footprint” that is below average due to the tendency to share accomodation.11
1M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
2M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
3M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
4M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
5M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
6M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 15.
7M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
8M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
9M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
10M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 20–22.
11M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
uneven spread of migrants across Britain, concentration in large cities but increasing presence in rural areas.2
Key agencies (1) Home office (2) MAC- Migration Advisory Committee has the role of determining employer needs (3) MIF- Migration Impact Forum3
compared to other countries long term migration intake in the UK is low, yet short term migration flow is high, and becoming more significant than long term.4
migration leading to changes in both large and smaller urban areas with an increase in diversity.5
Three major effects of migration on local economies: 1) skills 2) diversity 3) size of population and of economy.6
employers like migrants: 1) “hard and soft skills” 2) “bring fresh ideas, approaches and experiences.”7
tendency for the “downgrading” of highly skilled migrants.8
In the long term migration expected to have little if no effect on wage and employment levels. In the short term impact may be reduced by migrants competing between themselves for jobs UK population do not want. Marginalisation of migrants may cause problems as this may encourage a “cheap labour” fix rather than an improvement in technology and in the skills of the existing workforce.9
Diversity 1) widens skill set 2) innovation 3) emergence of new markets, both in the country and overseas.10
migrants have a “housing footprint” that is below average due to the tendency to share accomodation.11
1M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
2M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 9.
3M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 11.
4M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
5M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 14.
6M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 15.
7M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 16.
8M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18.
9M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 18–19.
10M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 20–22.
11M Nathan, Your Place or Mine? The Local Economics of Migration, (London: IPPR, 2008) 24.
Wednesday 22 October 2008
Muir
Hounslow as ethnically diverse, with immigrants tending to occupy different sectors.1
concern for community cohesion built up after riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham in 2001.2 concern increased with 9/11 and 7/7; difficulty for government to balance need for security and the damage of intrusive measures.3
London: 2001 census 59.7% declared themselves to be “White British” compared to 89.4% elsewhere.4
Although greater acceptance of cultural diversity in London, lower indicators of social capital.5 reasons (1) high incidence of single person households (2) international and inter-regional migration (3) high rates of residential mobility.6
high incidence of child poverty; income polarisation, competition for social housing, unemployment7
follows Putnam in distinguishing between bonding social capital, which is inward focused, and bridging social capital which is outward focused.8
points to Hounslow as one of the most ethnically diverse boroughs in London, whose ethnic population 35% in 2001 is expected to grow to 50% in 2010.9
residential discrimination and rise of extremism in Hounslow although on the whole relatively good relations.10
concern for community cohesion built up after riots in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham in 2001.2 concern increased with 9/11 and 7/7; difficulty for government to balance need for security and the damage of intrusive measures.3
London: 2001 census 59.7% declared themselves to be “White British” compared to 89.4% elsewhere.4
Although greater acceptance of cultural diversity in London, lower indicators of social capital.5 reasons (1) high incidence of single person households (2) international and inter-regional migration (3) high rates of residential mobility.6
high incidence of child poverty; income polarisation, competition for social housing, unemployment7
follows Putnam in distinguishing between bonding social capital, which is inward focused, and bridging social capital which is outward focused.8
points to Hounslow as one of the most ethnically diverse boroughs in London, whose ethnic population 35% in 2001 is expected to grow to 50% in 2010.9
residential discrimination and rise of extremism in Hounslow although on the whole relatively good relations.10
King
“As the oppressed of the East...the impoverished in the South...so the political rhetoric takes on a military tone: 'fortress Europe' under siege from the invasion of an army of migrants.”1
ius soli--> birthplace governs citizenship ius sanguinis; blood ties govern.2
difficulty of imposing very strict controls and maintaining the freedom of movement upon which Common Market was based.3
1R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
2R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
3R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 3.
ius soli--> birthplace governs citizenship ius sanguinis; blood ties govern.2
difficulty of imposing very strict controls and maintaining the freedom of movement upon which Common Market was based.3
1R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
2R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 1.
3R King and S Öberg, “Introduction: Europe and the future of mass migration” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 1–6, 3.
Muir
Points to the challenge to the “relatively hands-off” approach Britain has traditionally taken in relation to identity and citizenship caused by the threat of terror and the impact of globalization.1
2006 Mori Poll 40% see immigration as a major issue.2
“Sociologists have found that while (contrary to much media speculation) segregation in the UK is not increasing, it does remain high for certain groups in certain parts of the country”3
claims that new identity politics has set itself as against multi-culturalism which is believed to have gone to far and to be responsible for segregation.4
involves a stress on local identity, seen as essential to promote community cohesion.5
social cohesion can be promoted through: (1) tackling discrimination 2) tackling social inequality; many tensions caused when those on low income have to compete for welfare 3) cultural change through shared action (to increase contact), shared values, essentially those of citizenship (through citizenship education/tests, etc...) and shared identities 6
Promoting shared identity seen to have the specific contribution of promoting emotional attachment and a sense of solidarity.7
“Promoting shared identities can be no substitute for the difficult task of reducing social and economic inequalities.”8
Process of promoting shared identity should not be seen as a substitute for multiculturalism, which is a way of respecting difference within common institutions.9
“Rather than focusing on the much contested concept of multiculturalism, those who worry about segregation might do better to focus on the wide array of structural factors that in some parts of the country have allowed parallel lives to develop. These include the housing market, school choice and the poverty and low levels of social mobility that are acute for many minority groups.”10
“It is much easier for new migrant communities to retain links with their homelands or fellow immigrants in other countries than was once the case. In this context the role of institutions such as the BBC or the mainstream press in helping to define our collective experience as a society is much weaker than it was in the past, when many more people watched the same programmes and read the same papers.”11
points to a celebration of democracy, multiculturalism, music, arts, sport and heritage as means of developing a more open sense of British identity.12
1R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
3R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
4R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
5R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 6.
6R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 7–8.
7R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 8–9.
8R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
9R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
10R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10
11R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 14.
12R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 15–16.
2006 Mori Poll 40% see immigration as a major issue.2
“Sociologists have found that while (contrary to much media speculation) segregation in the UK is not increasing, it does remain high for certain groups in certain parts of the country”3
claims that new identity politics has set itself as against multi-culturalism which is believed to have gone to far and to be responsible for segregation.4
involves a stress on local identity, seen as essential to promote community cohesion.5
social cohesion can be promoted through: (1) tackling discrimination 2) tackling social inequality; many tensions caused when those on low income have to compete for welfare 3) cultural change through shared action (to increase contact), shared values, essentially those of citizenship (through citizenship education/tests, etc...) and shared identities 6
Promoting shared identity seen to have the specific contribution of promoting emotional attachment and a sense of solidarity.7
“Promoting shared identities can be no substitute for the difficult task of reducing social and economic inequalities.”8
Process of promoting shared identity should not be seen as a substitute for multiculturalism, which is a way of respecting difference within common institutions.9
“Rather than focusing on the much contested concept of multiculturalism, those who worry about segregation might do better to focus on the wide array of structural factors that in some parts of the country have allowed parallel lives to develop. These include the housing market, school choice and the poverty and low levels of social mobility that are acute for many minority groups.”10
“It is much easier for new migrant communities to retain links with their homelands or fellow immigrants in other countries than was once the case. In this context the role of institutions such as the BBC or the mainstream press in helping to define our collective experience as a society is much weaker than it was in the past, when many more people watched the same programmes and read the same papers.”11
points to a celebration of democracy, multiculturalism, music, arts, sport and heritage as means of developing a more open sense of British identity.12
1R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
3R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
4R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 5.
5R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 6.
6R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 7–8.
7R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 8–9.
8R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
9R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10.
10R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 10
11R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 14.
12R Muir, The New Identity Politics, (London: IPPR, 2007) 15–16.
Lowell
“For those who oppose labour migration to the UK and Europe, the potential for brain drain has become a useful political stick with which to beat those who want to see access to the world’s most successful labour markets opened up to those who live outside them.”1
Prefer the term “brain strain” to “brain drain” as it emphasises the two-way nature of the process.2
See international migration as an integral part of globalization and economic development and that things can be managed to be beneficial for both countries involved.3
Claims that Brazil would benefit from a higher level of increased skill emigration, as this would help stimulate higher education study.4
basic theory is that Brain strain will slow down the economic development of developing countries unless the following are promoted (1) managed migration, promoting temporary and circular migration (2) policies to increase the influence of the diaspora on home country through the transfer of knowledge and skills, remittances and investment (3) promotion of democracy and institutions, especially educational, in the sending country.5
1H Crawley & D Sriskandarajah “Preface” in B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 3–4, 3.
2B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.
3B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.
4B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 11.
5B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 13.
Prefer the term “brain strain” to “brain drain” as it emphasises the two-way nature of the process.2
See international migration as an integral part of globalization and economic development and that things can be managed to be beneficial for both countries involved.3
Claims that Brazil would benefit from a higher level of increased skill emigration, as this would help stimulate higher education study.4
basic theory is that Brain strain will slow down the economic development of developing countries unless the following are promoted (1) managed migration, promoting temporary and circular migration (2) policies to increase the influence of the diaspora on home country through the transfer of knowledge and skills, remittances and investment (3) promotion of democracy and institutions, especially educational, in the sending country.5
1H Crawley & D Sriskandarajah “Preface” in B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 3–4, 3.
2B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.
3B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 6.
4B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 11.
5B Lowell, A Findlay & E Stewart, Brain Strain: Optimising High Skilled Migration from Developing Countries, Asylum and Migration Working Paper 3, (London: IPPR, 2004) 13.
Humphries
Claims that when the Tories where in power it was possible for pro-immigrant groups to access funding from Labour councils, but this has become almost impossible with the coming of New Labour to power.1
differentiates between external controls in defining those who may enter the UK and internal controls in the “policing of welfare”.2
“In defending what is 'ours' we deny the human situations of the 'other'.”3
“immigration rules, laws and practices are formed around the notion that Britain has a certain way of life.”4
1B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 38.
2B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 39.
3 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 77.
4 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 89.
differentiates between external controls in defining those who may enter the UK and internal controls in the “policing of welfare”.2
“In defending what is 'ours' we deny the human situations of the 'other'.”3
“immigration rules, laws and practices are formed around the notion that Britain has a certain way of life.”4
1B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 38.
2B Humphries, “The Construction and Reconstruction of Social Work” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 29–41, 39.
3 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 77.
4 J Collett “Immigration is a Social Work Issue” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 77–93, 89.
Hayes
Migration is courageous, yet stories of migrants are often ignored to justify restrictive controls.1
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
“Those 'outsiders' we currently wish to control continue to be presented as a drain on the resources of the nation, despite their economic contribution... Those citizen 'insiders' are then encouraged to see themselves as part of and benefiting from the nation, and as fundamentally different and superior to the 'outsider', who should not enjoy the same rights. Who those 'outsiders' are remains the product of racism....encompasses new layers of the world's poor and dispossessed.” 2
“New Labour are all too aware of the support which can be gained by breeding popular nationalism based on fears of immigration.”3
claims that citizenship tests and oaths involve a “narrow view of nation.”4
critiques an “idea of nation which makes it appear natural for us to restrict our resources to our own.”5
emergence of the welfare state linked with improving national stock, therefore benefits were not to be accessible to aliens.6
“Here we see the centrality of the question of welfare in immigration control. At the heart of machinery is the need to let in only those who will be economically useful to the British nation and not likely to require welfare.”7 actually describing early 20th century.
1967 differential fees for international students; 1982 NHS charges for overseas visitors imposed.8
“anyone who is not a citizen with the right of abode is subject to the immigration rules which control who can come and stay before, during and after entry.”9
care in the community functions exclude those subject to immigration control.10
1D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 12.
2D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 13.
3D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 14.
4D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 15.
5D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16.
6D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 16–18.
7D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 17–18.
8D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 19.
9D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 20.
10D Hayes, “History and Context: The Impact of Immigration Control on Welfare Delivery” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 11–28, 22.
Fielding
Points to neo-liberal (ie free market) arguments against migration policies and libertarian arguments which see it as a breach of human rights.1
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.
arguments for controls (1) danger of one country being colonized by immigrants of another (2) borders need to be controlled to make liberal democracies manageable.2
“This conflict of interests and policy in industrialised societies...between maximising labour supply...and protecting a nation's cultural integrity...is a dilemma which admits few easy solutions.”3
experience with the apparatus of the nation state the most significant in the immigrant experience.4
increase in economic inequality between Europe and the rest of the world, leads to an increase in immigration controls and in illegal immigration.5
greater difficulty in the UK of reducing overstayers, whereas illegal entry less common than in other European countries.6
“It is difficult to withhold permanently the rights of citizenship from those who are required to fulfil the responsibilities of citizenship such as payment of taxes.”7
“The main problem, however, facing many immigrants and their family members is the legality of their status within the West European city.”8
London, concentration of ethnic minorities in inner suburbs, especially those north of the river.9
1A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41.
2A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 41–42.
3A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
4A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 42.
5A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 43.
6A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 49.
7A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 53.
8A Fielding, “Migrations, Institutions and Politics: The Evolution of European Migration Policies,” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 40–62, 56.
9P White, “Immigrants and the Social Geography of European Cities” in R King (ed), Mass Migration in Europe: The Legacy and the Future, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1993) 65–82, 74–75.
Farrant et al
“Public concern about immigration in general is at unprecedented levels (MORI 2005), with a significant proportion of people polled recently feeling that the Government does not have immigration under control (MORI 2003).
Irregular migration is seen as an important public issue in several ways:
• as evidence that the immigration system is failing or being abused
• as a challenge to national sovereignty (that is, the UK may not have total control over who comes and goes from the country)
• as potentially compromising the security of the UK (especially in light of growing fears about international terrorism)
• as exposing some vulnerable migrants to exploitation, in transit or when they get to the UK. “1
define irregular migrants as those “liable to be deported for issues related to immigration status.”2 reasons 1) entry by avoiding controls 2) false documents 3) overstay 4) unreturned asylum seekers 5) lack of papers 6) failure in applying for asylum elsewhere.3
preference for term irregular as it captures complexity of issue and avoids connotation with criminality; irregulars have committed administrative offences and not serious crimes.4
compares use of “Irregular” “Illegal” “Undocumented” and “Unauthorised.”5
points out that the reasons for irregular migration are basically the same as those for regular migration; “it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity”6;
preference for the residual method of determining # of irregular migrants (subtracting from the total number of foreign born residents those entitled to be here legally) range of 310,000-570,000 with a median estimate of 430,000. Limitations 1) does not include all those liable to deportation (e..g. Over-working students) 2) census data out of date.7
points to the many dangerous routes of entry into the UK.8
irregular migrants concentrated in those jobs which are “difficult, dirty and dangerous” (and low-paid)9
“There are several different estimates regarding the scale of the informal economy in the UK. One average ‘guesstimate’ of its size is 6.8 per cent of GDP or £75 billion (Small Business Council 2005). While there may be short‐term fiscal advantages for both the individual and the employer in the informal economy, the broader social and economic costs are significant, ranging from a loss of social protection and rights, to increased taxpayers’ burden and limited business expansion”10 nonetheless irregulars may ensure that some jobs are done; or do not have prices pushed up dramatically.11
regularisation would involve a contribution of £485 million to over £1 billion a year to the exchequer.12
cost of deportation averages at £ 11,000 a case.13
more restrictive controls in which migrants find it more difficult to travel to and from between home country and host country may encourage permanence.14
“Immigration to the UK has been less permanent than is commonly thought: almost half (46 per cent) of all overseas‐born immigrants left the UK within five years of arrival between 1981 and 2002 (Office for National Statistics 2004).”15
Difficulty in defending human rights of irregulars as 1) Britain has no written constitution 2) irregulars excluded from many international conventions 3) Bringing a case to court involves exposure and the risk of deportation.16
compares the effect of different policies towards irregular migration.17
UK Policy: 1) historically a reliance on external border control, including carrier liability 2) a trend towards the use of internal controls e.g. Ids 3) reduce the demand for irregular labour through employer sanctions (on the whole ineffective so far) 4) increase the scope for regular migration [but is current points system a form of reversing this for low skilled labour] 5) long residence concession (discretionary for adults with 14 consecutive years and children with seven) 18 No current plans for a major regularisation programme.19
1M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 4.
2M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
3M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
4M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
5M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 6.
6M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 8.
7M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 9.
8M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 10.
9M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 11.
10M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
11M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
12M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
13M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
14M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
15M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
16M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 14.
17M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 15.
18M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
19M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
Irregular migration is seen as an important public issue in several ways:
• as evidence that the immigration system is failing or being abused
• as a challenge to national sovereignty (that is, the UK may not have total control over who comes and goes from the country)
• as potentially compromising the security of the UK (especially in light of growing fears about international terrorism)
• as exposing some vulnerable migrants to exploitation, in transit or when they get to the UK. “1
define irregular migrants as those “liable to be deported for issues related to immigration status.”2 reasons 1) entry by avoiding controls 2) false documents 3) overstay 4) unreturned asylum seekers 5) lack of papers 6) failure in applying for asylum elsewhere.3
preference for term irregular as it captures complexity of issue and avoids connotation with criminality; irregulars have committed administrative offences and not serious crimes.4
compares use of “Irregular” “Illegal” “Undocumented” and “Unauthorised.”5
points out that the reasons for irregular migration are basically the same as those for regular migration; “it is the policies of receiving countries that create irregularity”6;
preference for the residual method of determining # of irregular migrants (subtracting from the total number of foreign born residents those entitled to be here legally) range of 310,000-570,000 with a median estimate of 430,000. Limitations 1) does not include all those liable to deportation (e..g. Over-working students) 2) census data out of date.7
points to the many dangerous routes of entry into the UK.8
irregular migrants concentrated in those jobs which are “difficult, dirty and dangerous” (and low-paid)9
“There are several different estimates regarding the scale of the informal economy in the UK. One average ‘guesstimate’ of its size is 6.8 per cent of GDP or £75 billion (Small Business Council 2005). While there may be short‐term fiscal advantages for both the individual and the employer in the informal economy, the broader social and economic costs are significant, ranging from a loss of social protection and rights, to increased taxpayers’ burden and limited business expansion”10 nonetheless irregulars may ensure that some jobs are done; or do not have prices pushed up dramatically.11
regularisation would involve a contribution of £485 million to over £1 billion a year to the exchequer.12
cost of deportation averages at £ 11,000 a case.13
more restrictive controls in which migrants find it more difficult to travel to and from between home country and host country may encourage permanence.14
“Immigration to the UK has been less permanent than is commonly thought: almost half (46 per cent) of all overseas‐born immigrants left the UK within five years of arrival between 1981 and 2002 (Office for National Statistics 2004).”15
Difficulty in defending human rights of irregulars as 1) Britain has no written constitution 2) irregulars excluded from many international conventions 3) Bringing a case to court involves exposure and the risk of deportation.16
compares the effect of different policies towards irregular migration.17
UK Policy: 1) historically a reliance on external border control, including carrier liability 2) a trend towards the use of internal controls e.g. Ids 3) reduce the demand for irregular labour through employer sanctions (on the whole ineffective so far) 4) increase the scope for regular migration [but is current points system a form of reversing this for low skilled labour] 5) long residence concession (discretionary for adults with 14 consecutive years and children with seven) 18 No current plans for a major regularisation programme.19
1M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 4.
2M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
3M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
4M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 5.
5M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 6.
6M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 8.
7M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 9.
8M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 10.
9M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 11.
10M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
11M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
12M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
13M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 12.
14M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
15M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 13.
16M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 14.
17M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 15.
18M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
19M Farrant, C Grieve & D Sriskandarajah, Irregular Migration in the UK: An IPPR Fact File, (London: IPPR, 2006) 17.
Dustmann
Large proportion of working immigrants are recent arrivals, 8% arrived in the last year, one third in the last 10.1
points to an increasing diversity in the country of origin of immigrants.2
“He ¯nds that immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than UK-born individuals with similar levels of skills. Borjas explains these results with what he calls enclave effects: Immigrants create enclaves by concentrating in geographical areas. Such enclaves then provide self-employment opportunities for other members of the respective national group. In these enclaves UK-born individuals lack knowledge of language and preferences of potential customers and have therefore a disadvantage when competing for the same self-employment opportunities.”3
“When computing the effect of language prffciency on the employment and wage gap between UK-born individuals and ethnic minority immigrants, the study concludes that lan-guage largely reduces differences in both economic outcomes.”4
claim that it is difficult to quantify the impact of immigration on the employment and wages of the resident population (1) on unemployment no clear evidence of adverse effect, some indication of increased unemployment but so small to be statistically insignificant (2) on wages, some indication of higher wages.5
1C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19.
2C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19–20.
3C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 41.
4C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 57.
5C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, The Local Labour Market Effects of Immigration in the UK, Home Office Online Report 06/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.p , 4–7.
points to an increasing diversity in the country of origin of immigrants.2
“He ¯nds that immigrants are more likely to be self-employed than UK-born individuals with similar levels of skills. Borjas explains these results with what he calls enclave effects: Immigrants create enclaves by concentrating in geographical areas. Such enclaves then provide self-employment opportunities for other members of the respective national group. In these enclaves UK-born individuals lack knowledge of language and preferences of potential customers and have therefore a disadvantage when competing for the same self-employment opportunities.”3
“When computing the effect of language prffciency on the employment and wage gap between UK-born individuals and ethnic minority immigrants, the study concludes that lan-guage largely reduces differences in both economic outcomes.”4
claim that it is difficult to quantify the impact of immigration on the employment and wages of the resident population (1) on unemployment no clear evidence of adverse effect, some indication of increased unemployment but so small to be statistically insignificant (2) on wages, some indication of higher wages.5
1C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19.
2C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf 19–20.
3C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 41.
4C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, Labour Market Performance of Immigrants in the UK Labour Market, Home Office Online Report 05/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0503.pdf, 57.
5C Dustmann, F Fabri, I Preston & J Wadsworth, The Local Labour Market Effects of Immigration in the UK, Home Office Online Report 06/03 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/rdsolr0603.p , 4–7.
Dench
Makes the point that a worker in a low-skilled job is not necessarily low skilled themselves.1 Points system to simplify the 50 ways one can enter the UK to work and study into one manageable system.2
explanation of current work permit scheme.3
EU enlargement seen to reduce the need for non-EEA migration of low skilled workers.4
students the largest category of people entering the UK eligible to work.5
reasons for hiring migrants 1) fill vacancies 2) willingness to work outside of regular hours 3) reputation for being hard working and efficient (esp. illegals)6
concentration of migrants in low-skilled jobs linked to the likelihood that they would stay.7
despite (or maybe because of?) tensions, migrant workers help to increase productivity of other workers.8
“Other respondents had experience of Brazilians masquerading as Portuguese, who were also exposed by fellow workers. It was commented that Portuguese can tell the difference between fellow expatriates and Brazilians, and that they resent these impostors.”9
exploitation of illegal migrants 1) lower pay 2) same pay but larger deductions (e.g. Accomodation costs) 3) long hours.10
difficulty for migrant workers to open accounts, many are charged by third-parties to allow access to accounts.11
1S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
2S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
3S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 4.
4S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 5.
5S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 14.
6S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 16–17.
7S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 25.
8S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 35.
9S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 62.
10S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 63.
11S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 64.s
explanation of current work permit scheme.3
EU enlargement seen to reduce the need for non-EEA migration of low skilled workers.4
students the largest category of people entering the UK eligible to work.5
reasons for hiring migrants 1) fill vacancies 2) willingness to work outside of regular hours 3) reputation for being hard working and efficient (esp. illegals)6
concentration of migrants in low-skilled jobs linked to the likelihood that they would stay.7
despite (or maybe because of?) tensions, migrant workers help to increase productivity of other workers.8
“Other respondents had experience of Brazilians masquerading as Portuguese, who were also exposed by fellow workers. It was commented that Portuguese can tell the difference between fellow expatriates and Brazilians, and that they resent these impostors.”9
exploitation of illegal migrants 1) lower pay 2) same pay but larger deductions (e.g. Accomodation costs) 3) long hours.10
difficulty for migrant workers to open accounts, many are charged by third-parties to allow access to accounts.11
1S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
2S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 2.
3S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 4.
4S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 5.
5S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 14.
6S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 16–17.
7S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 25.
8S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 35.
9S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 62.
10S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 63.
11S Dench, J Hurtsfield, D Hill & K Akroyd, Employers' Use of Migrant Labour: Main Report, Home Office Online Report 04/06, available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs06/rdsolr0406.pdf [Accessed October 16 2008] 64.s
Colley et al
Built upon a year long research by Gott and Johnston (Home Office) but increase it to cover a 5 year period. Also rather than comment on the net value of immigrants, compare relative contribution of migrants and non-migrants. Re typical objections 1) It is wrong to assign cost of immigration services to immigrants themselves as much of the rational of the Immigration system is to benefit UK population not immigrants...
“A simple example illustrates the problems inherent in apportioning the entire cost of the immigration system to immigrants themselves: if the government were to operate a ‘closed-door’ policy towards immigration (that is to say, not allow anyone enter the country on a permanent basis) then the costs of policing such a system would be enormous, but there would be no immigrants to assign this cost to. Conversely, if the government were to operate an ‘open-door’policy, then the costs are likely to fall while immigration may increase. Some of the costs of administering the immigration system (such as the employment of immigration officials at ports and airports) are unlikely to fall significantly even with reductions of immigration levels. On the other hand, some of the variable costs of the system are increasingly being recovered through user-charging of migrants and their prospective employers (through fees for work permits). This means that second-guessing which portion of the immigration system is for the benefit of the UK-born and which part is for immigrants is a difficult and potentially futile exercise.”1
Re issue of pension costs of migrants, this ignores that much contemporary migration is temporary in nature.2 3) re: issue of pressure on public services, reminder that migrants are disproportionately represented in the provision of public services.3
NAFI (net annual fiscal contribution, i.e. What is paid in taxes- what is received from government)
Immigrants>UK population. Hence, when there is a budget surplus, immigrants contribute more than UK population, when there is a budget deficit, immigrants receive less.4 (not commented in the paper, but this would be even more accentuated in those groups where there are little if no asylum seekers, thus Brazilians, for asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and thus pay tax, yet receive limited benefits)
1D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
2D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
3D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
4D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
c
“A simple example illustrates the problems inherent in apportioning the entire cost of the immigration system to immigrants themselves: if the government were to operate a ‘closed-door’ policy towards immigration (that is to say, not allow anyone enter the country on a permanent basis) then the costs of policing such a system would be enormous, but there would be no immigrants to assign this cost to. Conversely, if the government were to operate an ‘open-door’policy, then the costs are likely to fall while immigration may increase. Some of the costs of administering the immigration system (such as the employment of immigration officials at ports and airports) are unlikely to fall significantly even with reductions of immigration levels. On the other hand, some of the variable costs of the system are increasingly being recovered through user-charging of migrants and their prospective employers (through fees for work permits). This means that second-guessing which portion of the immigration system is for the benefit of the UK-born and which part is for immigrants is a difficult and potentially futile exercise.”1
Re issue of pension costs of migrants, this ignores that much contemporary migration is temporary in nature.2 3) re: issue of pressure on public services, reminder that migrants are disproportionately represented in the provision of public services.3
NAFI (net annual fiscal contribution, i.e. What is paid in taxes- what is received from government)
Immigrants>UK population. Hence, when there is a budget surplus, immigrants contribute more than UK population, when there is a budget deficit, immigrants receive less.4 (not commented in the paper, but this would be even more accentuated in those groups where there are little if no asylum seekers, thus Brazilians, for asylum seekers are not allowed to work, and thus pay tax, yet receive limited benefits)
1D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 6.
2D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
3D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 7.
4D Sriskandarajah, L Cooley & H Reed, Paying their Way: The Fiscal Contributions of Immigrants in the UK, (London: IPPR, 2008) 12.
c
Coheb
“controls can never be 'fair' to those subject to them. Nor can they ever be 'humane', in that the inevitable end game of all immigration control is forced, compulsory removal accompanied by the threat or actuality of legally sanctioned violence.”1
talks of a general system of immigration control in which workers in the medical and social sectors are conscripted to participate in.2
“immigration control can never have a benevolent face.”3
defends the “full restoration of all benefits and the end of all controls.” (Note this is in the context of asylum seeking)4
1S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 8.
2S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 8.
3S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 9.
4S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 10.
talks of a general system of immigration control in which workers in the medical and social sectors are conscripted to participate in.2
“immigration control can never have a benevolent face.”3
defends the “full restoration of all benefits and the end of all controls.” (Note this is in the context of asylum seeking)4
1S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 8.
2S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 8.
3S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 9.
4S Cohen, “Breaking the Links and Pulling the Plug” in D Hayes and B Humphries (eds) , Social Work, Immigration and Asylum, (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) 7–10, 10.
Chappell
Points out that migration is both affected and affects development.1 Figure 1 “The Development-Migration-Development Nexus”2 Table outlines the development impact of migration on country of origin in different areas.3
1L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
3L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 9–12.
1L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
2L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 4.
3L Chappell & D Sriskandarajah, Mapping the Development Impacts of Immigration, Development on the Move: Working Paper 1, (London: IPPR, 2007) 9–12.
Black et al
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Complexity of reasons for coming to the UK but include 1) safety, 2) existence of family members 3) human rights record.4) Economic opportunities1
illegal entry usually carried out by an agent.2
occupation usually within unskilled jobs especially in restaurants.3 lack of paperwork places constrain on type of work which can be done, and exposes migrants to exploitation, low pay and long hours.4 false documents means of better employment and higher pay.5
tendency to avoid or defer going to a doctor due to illegal status, preference for a pharmacist instead.6
High incidence of detention after raids at home or at work, or random checks by police in the street.7
“There was a common theme amongst respondents of the surprise of the raid, and the lack of time they were given to gather personal belongings, money and phone numbers. Respondents talked of how they werequickly arrested, taken to a police station and then moved to a detention centre that was often very far away from where they had lived, and where their friends and contacts were. It was clear that those who had been in the country for shorter periods of time, without good social networks, often lost everything in terms of
housing and possessions.”8
1R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 16–19.
2R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 20–22.
3R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 26.
4R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 26–28.
5R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 29.
6R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 39.
7R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 41–42.
8R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 43.
Complexity of reasons for coming to the UK but include 1) safety, 2) existence of family members 3) human rights record.4) Economic opportunities1
illegal entry usually carried out by an agent.2
occupation usually within unskilled jobs especially in restaurants.3 lack of paperwork places constrain on type of work which can be done, and exposes migrants to exploitation, low pay and long hours.4 false documents means of better employment and higher pay.5
tendency to avoid or defer going to a doctor due to illegal status, preference for a pharmacist instead.6
High incidence of detention after raids at home or at work, or random checks by police in the street.7
“There was a common theme amongst respondents of the surprise of the raid, and the lack of time they were given to gather personal belongings, money and phone numbers. Respondents talked of how they werequickly arrested, taken to a police station and then moved to a detention centre that was often very far away from where they had lived, and where their friends and contacts were. It was clear that those who had been in the country for shorter periods of time, without good social networks, often lost everything in terms of
housing and possessions.”8
1R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 16–19.
2R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 20–22.
3R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 26.
4R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 26–28.
5R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 29.
6R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 39.
7R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 41–42.
8R Black, M Collyer, R Skeldon & C Waddington, A Survey of the Illegally Resident Population in Detention in the UK, Home Office Online Report 20/05 available online at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/r224.pdf [Accessed October 17 2008] 43.
Wednesday 1 October 2008
Moxon
claims of widespread failure within the Home Office's Immigration and Nationality Directorate1 (1)
claims that “Britain is currently sustaining uncontrolled mass net immigration”2 (2)
“honesty about immigration looks like the thin end of a highly interesting wedge that could benefit us all.”3 (3)
affirms that the problem with migration is that those coming are unskilled and unsocialised in Western ways.4 (4-5)
“It is undeniable that these communities are necessarily divisive in their very presence within the cities where they are located.”5 (6)
note the use of a military analogy, in which immigration officers are presented as the “front line” protecting the country from attack.6 (7)
affirms that there is a lack of numbers and resources to support the work of immigration officers.7 (9)
denies that there is economic benefit from migration.8 (44-58) (1) no imminent decline in native population9 (45) (2) pension crises easily resolved by simple reforms such as ending compulsory retirement and raising retirement age.10 (45-47) (3) loss of jobs by native workers, and fall in wages11 (47) (4) cost in providing social services for migrants12 (48)
blames the importing of unskilled migrant workers for the industrial decline of Northern cities at a time when technological investment was required.13 (49)
claims that migration increases inequality in UK (a) employers benefit more than workers (b) inequality amongst migrants.14
counters Home Office claims that UK is 2-3 billion p/a better off with immigration claiming that it does not include many neglected costs.15
seems to suggest that migration is to blame for many men becoming unattractive to women because they cannot support themselves.16
points to abuse in the Work Permit system17
“problem of the free rider invading a host society from outside”18
claims the victim of migration is the “work ing class male”19
1S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 1.
2S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 2.
3S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 3.
4S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 4–5.
5S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 6.
6S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 7.
7S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 9.
8S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 44–58.
9S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45.
10S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 45-47.
11S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 47.
12S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 48.
13S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 49.
14S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 50.
15S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 51.
16S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 53.
17S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 56–57.
18S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 73.
19S Moxon, The Great Immigration Scandal, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004) 74.
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